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Abstract 
The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments require the U.S. EPA to control mercury emission outputs 
from coal-burning power plants through implementation of MACT, Maximum Achievable 
Control Technology, standards. However, in 2003 the Bush Administration revealed an 
alternative and controversial regulatory strategy for mercury, developing a cap and trade 
emissions credit trading program under the Clear Skies Initiative. Although emissions trading 
was proven to be a successfhl regulatory strategy for sulfur dioxide through the 1992 Acid Rain 
Program, the uniquely dangerous properties of mercury make this market-based regulation risky 
for certain vulnerable segments of the population. Since its unveiling, the Clear Skies cap and 
trade approach has been criticized for being too industry-friendly and inadequately setting limits 
on mercury emissions. Current challenges to the Clear Skies approach to the regulation of 
mercury claim that not only is it illegal under the Clear Air Act, but that it inhibits innovation 
and undermines an international strategy to reduce anthropogenic mercury emissions. 
This thesis evaluates the critiques of Clear Skies and the reasoning given by the EPA in defense 
of the regulation. Recent academic studies and a comparison case study with the Acid Rain 
Program are used to discuss the probable effects of Clear Skies on mercury reduction. The main 
questions addressed in the thesis are: 1) what is the motivation for Clear Skies? 2) what is the 
legal basis for the Initiative? 3) what are the potential failures of Clear Skies in protecting against 
mercury exposure? 4) what will be the resulting impact of Clear Skies on technological 
innovation? and 5) how does Clear Skies compare with international mercury reduction 
strategies? 
Thesis Supervisor: Nicholas A. Ashford 
Professor of Technology and Policy 
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Section 1 : Introduction I Motivation 
Each year electric power plants in the United States emit almost 50 tons of mercury, a hazardous 
air pollutant responsible for a number of health effects and resulting in fish advisories for bodies 
of water in 45 states. The potential risks of methylmercury exposure, the organic form mercury 
takes when deposited in water sources, range from neurological to physical disabilities caused 
mainly fiom in utero exposure though a pregnant woman's ingestion of fish containing traces of 
methylmercury. Although classified as a hazardous air pollutant under the Clean Air Act, 
mercury emissions have gone unregulated in the US and are still outside of effective regulatory 
control of the EPA. 
When President Bush announced the Clear Skies Initiative in 2003 as his Administration's 
proposed mercury reduction regulatory program, debate over market-based and traditional 
command-and-control standards for environmental regulation was renewed. The Clear Skies 
Initiative for mercury, s u l h  dioxide, and nitrogen oxides seeks to reduce emissions through a 
national emissions credit trading program. The three years following the unveiling of Clear Skies 
produced a flurry of activity fiom academics and non-profits arguing the serious flaws of market- 
based regulation for control of a substance as hazardous as methylmercury. The literature and 
research work during this time covered important topics such as the reevaluation of cost-benefit 
analysis as a tool to critique environmental policy, the potential emergence of mercury "hot- 
spots" in localized areas, the in utero and neonatal effects of mercury that challenge the 
traditional dose-response curve for "safe" levels of exposure, and a challenge of extending the 
legal framework for cap and trade policy to mercury under the Clean Air Act. The totality of this 
work demonstrates the serious risks of mercury exposure that would continue under the Clear 
Skies Initiative and makes a compelling case for more stringent and traditional regulation of 
mercury emissions. 
This thesis evaluates mercury regulation under Clear Skies in light of recent studies questioning 
the efficiency, legality, and safety of market-based regulation for mercury. It will expand the 
ongoing discussion to suggest the likely effects of Clear Skies on industry behavior, measured by 
new technology development and incentives to innovate. Additionally, this work addresses the 
place of Clear Skies regulation in a global regulatory framework to reduce mercury emissions, as 
well as looks at the role of state governments in the regulatory efforts. Given the breadth of 
research challenging the Administration's expected success of Clear Skies and the potential 
economic, political, and health consequences, the question of "why cap and trade?" remains 
especially important. I will address several historical and political reasons for the shift from 
traditional command-and-control environmental policy to market-based policy. Along with an 
evaluation of the political factors leading to the proposal of Clear Skies, I will compare the 
theoretical arguments for both market-based regulation and command-and-control environmental 
regulation. Perhaps most importantly, this thesis will address alternatives to the federal Clear 
Skies program for mercury reduction, evaluating state programs, alternative market-based 
approaches, and a possible return to more stringent command-and-control regulation. 
Section 2: Background on Mercury 
Mercury Overview 
There are two main types of mercury that exist in the environment: inorganic mercury and 
organic mercury. Inorganic mercury includes mercury in its basic elemental states, as well as 
mercury oxides and mercury salts. Organic mercury refers to alkylated compounds, such as 
methylmercury1. While all forms are harrnll at certain doses, methylmercury is the largest threat 
to human health, as it is the byproduct of inorganic mercury reacting with bacteria in water, and 
the form of mercury that is consumed at dangerous levels by humans. Methylmercury would not 
be a threat if not for the release of inorganic forms of mercury into the environment. While 
inorganic mercury can be released from natural sources such as water and volcanic activity, its 
existence in the atmosphere is mostly due to industrial emissions from incinerators and coal- 
burning electric power plants. 
Before depositing into soil and water sources, which initiates the conversion to methylmercury, 
inorganic mercury can travel in the atmosphere. Mercury emissions from anthropogenic sources 
are typically categorized into three types: elemental mercury ( ~ ~ 4 ,  reactive gaseous mercury 
(H~"), and particulate-bound divalent mercury (Hg,). EPA modeling of mercury deposition 
suggests that when released as emission gas, H ~ "  and Hgp will deposit locally or regionally, 
within 50Km of a coal-burning plant. This accounts for approximately 50% of mercury 
emissions fkom such a plant. The other 50% of mercury is emitted in the H ~ '  form, which is 
much less soluble and has a half-life of 18 months2. This form of mercury is able to travel 
globally before converting to H ~ " ,  falling to the ground, and then undergoing the conversion to 
methylmercury. These chemical properties of mercury make it both a local and global problem. 
It also suggests the possibility for the emergence of "hot-spots" or geographic areas of increased 
mercury depositions localized around mercury-emitting power plants. 
Once mercury is deposited on the earth's surface, it either directly settles in a water source or 
finds its way there through runoff or absorption into soil and the groundwater supply. When in 
water, inorganic mercury will react with the sulfate-reducing organisms present to undergo a 
chemical reaction, producing methylmercury. Fish can absorb methylmercury directly from the 
water contact with their gills or they can consume it when eating small organisms. 
Methylmercury binds to amino acids and is retained at high rates in muscle tissue3. 
Bioaccumulation occurs as larger fish feed on smaller fish, each time increasing the levels of 
mercury retained and stored in their system. Humans and other animals that eat fish will ingest 
methylmercury this way. The pathway from inorganic mercury emission from a coal-burning 
power plant to the human consumption of methylmercury is shown in Figure 1 below, taken 
fiom the US Environmental Protection Agency. 
Figure 1: The Mercury Deposition Cycle 
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Source: US Environmental Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov/mercury/exposure.htm 
Health Effects of Mercury Exposure 
Methylmercury is especially hazardous because almost 95% of the compound ingested is 
absorbed in the body. It can easily enter the blood stream and affect organs such as the kidney 
and liver. Most dangerous is the ability for mercury to pass the blood-brain barrier in adults and 
the placenta tissue in pregnant women. This activity can lead to adult neurotoxicity and a number 
of neurological effects in unborn babies, leading to a wide range of disabilities. Infants are 
especially susceptible to methylmercury exposure from the environment since the blood brain 
barrier is not fully formed until approximately 1 year of age. Methylmercury will stay in the 
body for a period of 2-3 months before it is demethylated and returned to an inorganic mercury 
form that can be excreted4. 
The earliest study on the harms of methylmercury exposure from fish consumption was 
conducted in 1956 in Minamata, Japan. In this region, pregnant women who ingested large 
amounts of fish resulted in over 30 cases of newborns with disability, including cerebral palsy, 
mental delay, blindness, deafness, and speech disorders. The dose of methylmercury ingested by 
women in Minamata was exceptionally high and a very rare occurrence of mercury poisoning. 
However, the study of the disabled children has helped establish scientifically the following 
basic facts about methylmercury5: 
1. Environmental pollution can redeposit in the food chain and more specifically 
methylmercury can and will settle in fish. 
2. Methylmercury can be ingested through fish in quantities large enough to harm the fetus. 
In Iraq in 1972, thousands of citizens were ill and later found to be poisoned after a 
methylmercury fungicide was used. Most of the sick were children or newborns. Dr. M.R. 
Greenberg examined death registries from cities around the hngicide exposure and found that 
more deaths occurred in 1972 than years directly before or after. Most alarming was that "deaths 
for the 1 - 10 and 1 1-20 year age groups during the year 197 1-72 were four-fold higher than the 
mean of the two preceding and two following years6." This yielded conclusive evidence that 
methylmercury was indeed a fatal toxin, especially to young children and newborns. The Iraqi 
and Japanese cases of methylmercury exposure and related health effects are cited as the 
standard evidence that methylmercury can have severe health impacts on unborn or newborn 
children, even when adult populations go seemingly unaffected. 
In addition to the two historical cases of mass methylmercury poisoning that suggest the 
relationship between methylmercury exposure and disability, there are three additional recent 
large-scale epidemiology studies that are the basis for almost all subsequent methylmercury 
research and policy decisions. These epidemiological studies are known for their place of testing 
as the Faroe Island, the Seychelles, and the New Zealand studies. Each of the studies looks at 
mother-infant pairs fiom areas with a high rate of fish consumption. While all three found some 
links between methylmercury and neurological damage, only the Faroes and the New Zealand 
studies concluded a relationship between in utero methylmercury exposure and health effects, 
which the Seychelles Study did not have enough evidence to reach the same conclusion7. 
Unfortunately, there has been no conclusive reason given to explain the variation in the studies. 
Most alarming were the New Zealand study results, which suggested that in utero mercury 
exposure results in a 3-point decrease in 1Q. The Faroes study concluded that in utero mercury 
exposure caused memory, language development, and attention problems8. The results from 
these studies were used by the National Research Council in 2000 when it set a reference dose 
(tolerable limit) for mercury consumption, which was later adopted as the official reference does 
by the EPA. 
The harmfulness of methylmercury has been established by the above mentioned studies, the 
National Research Council, and the EPA. However, the risks of methylmercury exposure have 
until now been limited to a discussion of physical disabilities such as cerebral palsy, neurological 
damage, and cardiac problems. More recent and controversial studies have examined the link 
between mercury exposure and Autism or behavioral disorders such as ADHD. Autism affects 1 
in 166 children born today, a rate that has increased 10-fold since the 1 980's9. The classic 
symptoms of autism, loss of communication and social skills, are also interestingly symptoms of 
mercury poisoning. While the exact causes of autism are unknown, there are two hypotheses 
linking autism to mercury. The first, backed by the Public Health Service and American 
Academy of Pediatrics, claims a causal link between autism and exposure to ethylmercury in 
Thimerosal, a vaccine preservative. Thimerosal was injected with many childhood 
immunizations from 1988 until 2002, when it was taken off the market out of safety concerns. 
The second newly hypothesized link between mercury and autism is the effect of methylmercury 
on infants and the unborn. In a 2004 study, researchers found a "biomarker' in autistic children 
that strongly suggests that these children would be susceptible to the harmful effects of mercury 
and other toxic chemicalslO." The research showed that autistic children have less active 
glutathione, the chemical required for excretion of heavy metals, than average children. If a child 
with low levels of active glutathione was exposed to methylmercury in utero or during infancy, it 
would have little capability to excrete the mercury, leading to neurological damage and 
potentially symptoms consistent with autism1 I. 
Exposure Levels 
To protect consumers from methylmercury health risks, the EPA has set a reference dose (RfD) 
for consumption of methylmercury, which is the amount that can be consumed each day over a 
lifetime without posing a risk to health. Based on data from the 1972 mercury poisoning in Iraq, 
the EPA set the US RfD at 0.1 micrograms per kilogram of body weight per day. The accuracy 
of his reference dose was confirmed by the National Research Council in a 2002 review of 
methylmercury health effects. Yet despite setting an appropriate threshold for mercury exposure, 
the EPA and FDA can do little to ensure that adults and children do not exceed this dose. 
Approximately 8% of pregnant women in the US have levels of methylmercury in her blood 
greater than the 0.1 pg/kg day, resulting in 630,000 babies born annually with increased risk of 
health problems from methylmercury exposure12. 
There are two critical problems with setting an effective reference dose for consumption: 1) 
informing and educating those consumers who are at risk and 2) monitoring levels of 
methylmercury in fish products so that consumers can be assured they are not exceeding the 
reference dose. Concerned with these potential problems, the Mercury Policy Project surveyed 
fish sold in major grocery stores during the summer of 2005. The objective was to test fish 
products in order to determine whether they fell below the FDA's allowable mercury level of 1 
ppm in fish, and if consumption of such fish would remain below EPA's reference dose of 0.1 
micrograms of mercury per kilogram of body weight per day. The results, taken from 22 grocery 
stores nationwide, were disturbing. The study found that over half of the stores sold swordfish 
with a mercury concentration over 1 ppm, including some fish samples over 2 ppm, double the 
allowable level. Tuna testing results concluded that "a 44 pound child consuming 6 ounces of 
tuna a week at this mercury concentration would be exposed to 4 times the EPA reference dose 
for mercury. A 120 pound woman consuming 6 ounces of tuna a week at this mercury 
concentration would be exposed to one and a half times the EPA reference doseI3." Therefore, a 
person consuming more than one serving of tuna a week would be at a significantly higher risk 
of mercury exposure than determined safe by the EPA. 
Mercury Advisories in the US 
To protect citizens from consuming methylmercury at levels above the reference dose, the EPA 
issues a number of fish advisory warnings each year, which warn against consumption from any 
fish caught in the specified bodies of water. There are currently advisories for mercury in 43 
states, some of which are under a state-wide advisory for every body of water. In total, 35% of 
the nation's lake acres (14,285,062 acres) and 24% of the nation's total river miles (839,441 
miles) are under fish advisories. In addition, the EPA warns against fish caught in 65% of the 
coastal waters, mostly on the East Coast. Due to their geographic location due north of the 
nation's major mercury emitters in the Ohio River Valley, 100% of the Great Lakes are under an 
advisory for mercury14. Figure 2 shows the most current EPA advisories for mercury in bodies of 
water, set in 2004. 
Figure 2: Mercury Advisories in the US 
Source: US Environmental Protection Agency, www.epa.nov/ost/fish (2004) 
While there are a number of pollutants in the US that make their way into the nation's water 
supply, mercury is one of the largest threats. Despite runoffs and direct output of chemical 
pollution from plants, mercury's ability to convert to methylmercury and accumulate in fish 
makes it one of the most dangerous chemicals released into the environment. Additionally, 
mercury's ability to travel in the atmosphere greatly increases the area at risk from mercury 
deposition. There are currently three times as many mercury advisories for lakes than the next 
most hazardous pollutant in water bodies, PCBs. Figure 3 compares the number of EPA 
advisories for lake acres at risk from mercury, PCBs, Chlorodane, Dioxins, and DDT. In addition 
to mercury advisories far outnumbering other lake advisories, mercury is the only pollutant that 
has warranted a dramatic increase in the number of advisories. In the past ten years, mercury 
advisories more than tripled, while fish consumption and lake advisories for other chemicals 
have remained constant. Figure 4 shows the increase in percentage of lake acres and river miles 
at risk from mercury contamination over the past decade. 
Figure 3: Mercury Compared with Other Toxins Found in US Lakes 
Source: US Environmental Protection Agency, www.epa/gov/ost/fish (2004) 
Figure 4: Increase in Mercury Advisories from 1993-2004 
Source: US Environmental Protection Agency, 
Sources of Mercury 
Although some mercury emission occurs naturally from land and oceans, the majority of global 
mercury emission is from anthropogenic sources. Of the 4,850 total tons of mercury particles that 
are released into the atmosphere each year, 2,750 tons of that (57%) comes from man-made 
sources15. In the US, coal-fired utility plants are the major emitters of mercury, responsible for 
48 tons annually or 36% of total US mercury emissions. Oil and natural gas utilities emit a 
fraction of that, with approximately 0.5 tons per year attributed to each industry. Other sources of 
mercury emissions in the US are ore mining, chlorine production, incineration of municipal and 
hazardous waste, and industrial boilers. The breakdown of tons of mercury emitted by each 
industry annually is displayed in Figure 5. There are approximately 500 coal-burning power 
plants in the Since coal-fired plants are the largest source polluters of mercury, they are the 
source of greatest potential for federal regulations to have an effect in reducing mercury output, 
which is why that industry is the focus of this thesis and the recent Clear Skies Initiative. A 
discussion of how anthropogenic mercury emissions in the US compares to those in other 
developed nations will be discussed in Section 10. 
Figure 5: Sources of Mercury 
Table 1. Mercury Emissions Sources 
Sources to Atmosphere Annual Emission Rate (tons yr-') Reference 
Natural Emissions Land 1000 Mason et al., 2002; 1100 Lamborg et al., 2002 
Oceanic Evasion 2850a Mason et al., 2002; 900 Lamborg et al., 2002 
Anthropogenic Northern Hemispherea 2450 Lamborg et al., 2002 
Anthropogenic Southern Hemisphere 450 Lamborg et al., 2002 
Total Global Anthropogenic 2650 Mason et al.. 2002; 2850 Lamborg et al., 2002 
I Total Global Emissions I 4850 I U.S. EPA. 2003a 
U.S. Utility Boilers 48.9 (36?41)~ U.S. EPA, 2003a 
Coal 48.0 
Oil 0.5 
Natural gas 0.4 
U.S. Ore 
Gold Ore 
Iron Ore 
Silver Ore 
U.S. EPA, 2003a 
Ferroalloy Ores, Except Vanadium 5.5E-4 
U.S. Chlorine Production 6.5 (5%) U.S. EPA, 2003a 
U.S. Municipal Waste Combustors 5.1 (4%) U.S. EPA. 2003a 
# U.S. Hazardous Waste Combustion I 5.0 (4%) I U.S. EPA, 200G 
Commercial Hazardous Waste 
lncinerators 
On-Site Hazardous Waste Incinerators 
Hazardous Waste Incineration 
U.S. Industrial Boilers 3.8 (3%) U.S. EPA, 2003a 
Industrial/CommerciaI/lnstitutional 
Boilers & Process Heaters 3.28 
Stationary Combustion Turbines 0.51 
U.S. Medical Waste Incinerators 2.8 (2%) U.S. EPA, 2003a 
Subtotal (U.S. Sources) 83.8 (61%) U.S. EPA, 2003a 
Total Point and Non-point U.S. Emissions 136.3 
'In the Mason and Schetl f2G021 model much of the mercury released to the atmosphere from the ocean re deposits into ocean. 
The percentage of total U.S. anthropogenic emissions as simulated in CIS. EPA !2'03aj IS Sased on '899 emission estimates. 
U.S. anthropogenic emission estimates have Seen upcatec ~WNLV S C ) ~ . L I O V . ~ ~  cn ef). 
W e  developed th~s estlmate based or natural global mercury emissions estimates of Larnborg st al. !2002). Us~ng Lamborg's 
approach. the U.S. sstlmare is basec on the ratio of U.S. landmass to total landmass of northern hemisphere 
Source: Harnrni tt, James K. and Rice, Glenn. Economic Valuation of'Hzrrnan Health Bendits of' Controlling Mercury 
Emissionsj-om US Coal-Fired Power Plants. Harvard Center for Risk Analysis. NESCAUM, Northeast States for 
Coordinated Air Use Management. February 2005. 
Section 3: US Legal Structure for Mercury Emissions 
The legal framework for regulating anthropogenic sources of mercury in the US is found in the 
Clean Air Act and subsequent Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. Under Section 1 12, mercury 
is classified as a Hazardous Air Pollutant, or HAP, the classification of which mandates that the 
EPA develop standards for mercury emissions from new and existing sources. In addition to 
requiring the regulation of mercury, Section 1 12 mandates the regulatory methodology that is to 
be used by the EPA for regulation of all 189 hazardous air pollutants listed. Known as the 
Maximum Achievable Control Technology standard, or MACT, this policy sets limits for 
emissions of HAPs based on current feasible technology. MACT is a command-and-control 
policy that mandates compliance from industry by setting acceptable levels of emissions at the 
same level as those currently being admitted from the best 12% of performers in the industry. 
While MACT accounts for available technology and therefore considers technology costs, it is 
only based on current performance of plants, not maximizing the potential for regulation to 
encourage innovation and a feasible technology that would emit less mercury. Alternatively, 
Section 112 allows for the Administrator to set a standard higher than MACT if human health 
effects warrant such a regulation to protect health "within an adequate margin of safety." The 
language of the statute does not discuss the ambiguity over setting such a margin of safety and 
whether it can realistically be set at a certain acceptable threshold from a health perspective. 
Clean Air Act Section 112 
Section 1 12 of the Clean Air Act defines the term "Hazardous Air Pollutant (HAP)," lists 189 
known HAPs, and outlines mandatory action that must be taken by the EPA to regulate the 
pollutants, which includes determining and setting appropriate emission levels for each pollutant. 
Under Section 112 (b), all mercury compounds are listed as Hazardous Air Pollutants, which 
includes the organic form, methylmercury. Section 112 (d) 2 defines appropriate standards and 
methods that may be taken by the EPA to regulate emissions of hazardous air pollutants. Those 
standards and methods : 
(A) reduce the volume of, or eliminate emissions of, such pollutants through process changes, 
substitution of materials or other modifications, 
(El) enclose systems or processes to eliminate emissions, 
(C) collect, capture or treat such pollutants when released from a process, stack, storage or fugitive 
emissions point, 
(D) are design, equipment, work practice, or operational standards (including requirements for operator 
training or certification) as provided in subsection (h), or 
(E) are a combination of the above. 
In order to achieve the standards set by the EPA for emissions of hazardous air pollutants, the 
Clean Air Act Amendments mandate the use of Maximum Achievable Control Technology 
regulations. The text of Section 112 (d) 3, which outlines MACT, is presented below. It is 
important to note that the Section (d) charges the EPA with setting standards that are either equal 
or more stringent to the determined health threshold and Maximum Achievable Control 
Technology. Section 112 (d) 4 allows for the Administrator to establish a safe threshold for 
pollutant exposure and base regulations on this threshold. Since there is the ability for the EPA to 
consider the uniquely toxic properties of mercury when deciding on appropriate regulation, 
MACT does not serve as the strictest command-and-control policy for mercury regulation under 
Section 112. The public debate over the effectiveness of MACT in comparison to cap and trade 
emissions permit trading typically does not include an important alternative to mercury 
regulation allowed under Section 112, which would base regulation standards solely on human 
health effects. 
Excerpt from Clean Air Act, Section 112 (d) 
(3) New and existing sources.- The maximum degree of reduction in emissions that is deemed achievable 
for new sources in a category or subcategory shall not be less stringent than the emission control that is 
achieved in practice by the best controlled similar source, as determined by the Administrator. Emission 
standards promulgated under this subsection for existing sources in a category or subcategory may be 
less stringent than standards for new sources in the same category or subcategory but shall not be less 
stringent, and may be more stringent than - 
(A) the average emission limitation achieved by the best performing 12 percent of the existing sources 
(for which the Administrator has emissions information), excluding those sources that have, within 
18 months before the emission standard is proposed or within 30 months before such standard is 
promulgated, whichever is later, first achieved a level of emission rate or emission reduction which 
complies, or would comply if the source is not subject to such standard, with the lowest achievable 
emission rate (as defined by section 171) applicable to the source category and prevailing at the time, 
in the category or subcategory for categories and subcategories with 30 or more sources, or 
(B) the average emission limitation achieved by the best performing 5 sources (for which the 
Administrator has or could reasonably obtain emissions information) in the category or subcategory 
for categories or subcategories with fewer than 30 sources. 
(4) Health threshold.- With respect to pollutants for which a health threshold has been established, the 
Administrator may consider such threshold level, with an ample margin of safety, when establishing 
emission standards under this subsection. 
(5) Alternative standard for area sources.- With respect only to categories and subcategories of area 
sources listed pursuant to subsection (c), the Administrator may, in lieu of the authorities provided in 
paragraph (2) and subsection (f), elect to promulgate standards or requirements applicable to sources in 
such categories or subcategories which provide for the use of generally available control technologies or 
management practices by such sources to reduce emissions of hazardous air pollutants. 
(6) Review and revision.- The Administrator shall review, and revise as necessary (taking into account 
developments in practices, processes, and control technologies), emission standards promulgated under 
this section no less often than every 8 years. 
(7) Other requirements preserved.- No emission standard or other requirement promulgated 
under this section shall be interpreted, construed or applied to diminish or replace the 
requirements of a more stringent emission limitation or other applicable requirement 
established pursuant to section 111, part C or D, or other authority of this Act or a standard 
issued under State authority. 
A Timeline of US Mercury Regulation 
Although classified by Congress and the EPA as a Hazardous Air Pollutant and subject to 
regulation under the Clean Air Act Amendments, mercury emissions have gone unregulated in 
the US to this day. In 1994, the EPA announced to Congress that it would complete a "Utility Air 
Toxics Study" in order to determine if it is "appropriate and necessary" to regulate power plants 
under the Clean Air Act. In 1997, an EPA study of the health impacts of mercury was presented 
to Congress, which was one of the first comprehensive studies on the health effects of mercury17. 
An additional report on power plant emissions was presented to Congress in 1998, who 
determined in 2000 that it was indeed "appropriate and necessary" to regulate power plants under 
Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, focusing on their dangerous emission of mercury. This 
Congressional decision was known as the "Utility Air Toxins Determination" and was followed 
by a Congressional commitment to regulate mercury by March 2003. Regulating under Section 
1 12 would require the Maximum Achievable Control Technology standard to be set in 
consideration of the best performing 12% of mercury emitters, which in 2003 would result in a 
more stringent regulation, with a mandatory 90% reduction in mercury emissions in all power 
plants. 
When Congress decided in 2000 that mercury emissions from power plants was indeed mandated 
by Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, almost a decade had passed since mercury was listed in 
Section 112 as a hazardous air pollutant. The appropriate threshold for the pollutant was studied 
under the Clinton Administration's EPA up until the final hours of the Administration, when the 
outgoing Clinton EPA recommended a regulatory plan based on MACT in December 2000, with 
hopes that the new Administration would favor this MACT and command-and-control policy 
over a more industry-friendly approach. However, one of the first acts of the Bush 
Administration EPA was to overturn Clinton's suggested policy and advocate for an alternative 
market-based approach to regulation. Although less stringent that the proposed Clinton MACT 
program in 2000, the Bush EPA used the fact that the Clinton EPA sat on the mercury 
regulations for the entire duration of the Administration without regulating, which helped them 
gain political support for their revised mercury policy. In March 2003, the EPA unveiled its new 
regulatory plan for reducing mercury emissions under the Clear Skies Initiative. Under Clear 
Skies, an emission credit and trading program (known as cap and trade) is proposed for mercury, 
which would mirror the successful Acid Rain emission credit program of the early 1990's. The 
legal basis for Clear Skies and cap and trade is discussed more in depth in the following section. 
Clean Air Act Section 11 1: Emission Trading 
Although politically controversial, the current EPA argues that legally cap and trade is allowed 
under Section 11 1 of the Clean Air Act. Under the Cap and Trade system, the federal 
government lowers and caps the national total allowable emission level for mercury from power 
plants. The EPA then divides this set emissions level among the fifty states. Each state's 
regulatory agency then has the authority to further allocate emission levels to utility companies. 
Under cap and trade, power plants are given the decision to implement cleaner mercury- 
reduction technologies in order to sell or bank pollution credits, or they may continue or increase 
pollution of mercury through purchasing credits from other plants. Thus, the incentive to 
innovate and lower pollution under cap and trade for the industry is a financial one. There are a 
number of questions over the efficacy of cap and trade in predicting whether power plants will 
indeed be motivated to lower emissions. Additionally, the equity of cap and trade has also been 
challenged, as it allows for the potential creation of hot-spots, or areas of increased concentration 
around those plants that may choose not to lower emissions. Before evaluating the merits of 
arguments for and against cap and trade, especially in regards to Clear Skies and mercury, it is 
necessary to evaluate the legal basis for this regulatory decision. 
To regulate mercury under CAA Section 1 1 1, the EPA first has to justify removing mercury 
from the jurisdiction of 112. The Agency has failed to do that under Section 112(c) 9, which only 
allows for delisting if 
(1) in the case of carcinogens, that emissions from any one source from the category will not pose a risk 
of greater than one in one million or more to the most exposed individual in the relevant population; 
OR 
(2) in the case of other hazardous air pollutants, that the emissions level from any one source will be low 
enough adequately to protect the public health with an ample margin of safety and to avoid an 
adverse environmental effect 
The EPA has not presented any evidence that methylmercury would fall under these exceptions 
and allow for delisting. The rationale given by the EPA for not regulating under Section 112 is 
that Section 11 1 can be applied and therefore overrules the mandate for MACT command-and- 
control regulation in Section 1 1218. EPA points to Section 112(n) which requires that the Agency 
"study alternate control strategies" to justify cap and trade. However, many legal scholars argue 
that the intention of Congress was not consideration of alternative forms of regulation, but 
instead the specifics of MACT command-and-control regulation. 
There are two subsections of legislation under Clean Air Act Section 11 1 that are used by the 
EPA in justifying a cap and trade regulatory strategy for mercury. The first is Section 1 1 1 (a) 1, 
in which the law defines performance standards: 
Sec. 11 1. (a) For purposes of this section: 
(1) The term "standard of performance" means a standard for emissions of air pollutants which 
reflects the degree of emission limitation achievable through the application of the best system of emission 
reduction which (taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction and any non air quality health and 
environmental impact and energy requirements) the Administrator determines has been adequately 
demonstrated. 
Based on cost-benefit analyses, the EPA determined that cap and trade is the most cost effective 
regulatory strategy to reduction of mercury emissions. To support that decision legally, the EPA 
argues that the specific phrase "best system of emission reduction" allows the EPA to implement 
cap and trade regulations over MACT. Additionally, the EPA uses Section 11 1 (h) to argue that 
alternative regulations (that do not follow MACT) are allowed. 
Excerpt from Section 1 1 1 (h): 
(1) For purposes of this section, if in the judgment of the Administrator, it is not feasible to prescribe or 
enforce a standard of performance, he may instead promulgate a design, equipment, work practice, or  
operational standard, or  combination thereof, which reflects the best technological system of continuous 
emission reduction which (taking into consideration the cost of achieving such emission reduction, and any 
non-air quality health and environmental impact and energy requirements) the Administrator determines 
has been adequately demonstrated. In the event the Administrator promulgates a design or  equipment 
Standard under this subsection, he shall include as part of such standard such requirements as will assure the 
proper operation and maintenance of any such element of design or  equipment [emphasis added]. 
Using this language without addressing feasibility or enforcement, EPA argues they have the 
right to "promulgate a design, equipment, work practice, or operational standard, or combination 
thereof, which reflects the best technological system of continuous emission reduction." Again, 
the language "best system" is used by the EPA to replace language requiring "maximum 
achievable controllable technology" under Section 112. However, in arguing that Section 11 l(h) 
allows for cap and trade, the EPA neglects the requirements of the "best technological system" 
standard. Section 1 11 (h) goes on to say: 
(2) For the purpose of this subsection, the phrase "not feasible to prescribe or  enforce a standard of 
performance" means any situation in which the Administrator determines that 
(A) a pollutant or  pollutants cannot be emitted through a conveyance designed and constructed to 
emit or  capture such pollutant, or  that any requirement for, or  use of, such a conveyance would be 
inconsistent with any Federal, State, or  local law, or  
(B) the application of measurement methodology to a particular class of sources is not practicable 
due to technological or  economic limitations. 
This clearly indicates that Congress intended Section 1 1 1 to be used only when pollution capture 
technology was not available or so expensive that it was impractical. However, the long-proven 
effectiveness and use of scrubbers to reduce mercury emissions makes this clause null for the use 
of mercury regulation, since cost-effective technology does exist in practice. To address legal 
difficulties, Clear Skies would effectively amend Section 1 12 to exclude electric utilities from 
MACT regulation if they are subject to Section 11 1. Ironically, the EPA does stipulate that all 
non-mercury hazardous air pollutants should remain regulated under Section 1 12 and MACT. 
Cap and Trade Regulatory Program 
The concept of tradable emissions permits arose in the 1960s, and was deemed successful after 
implementation in the 1990s for sulfur dioxide reduction. The emission permits are a commodity 
that can be bought and sold in a market between power plants throughout the nation. Much like 
any market, with perfect information, the permit trading market would be efficient and equitable 
under perfect conditions. However, in the realistic market situation of less than perfect 
information and irrational decision making, this is not likely to occur. It is naive of the 
Administration to hope for a perfect emissions trading market when such perfection has never 
been reached in the market. Unlike traditional command-and-control regulation, the outcome of a 
cap and trade system is largely speculative and based on market performance. Therefore, it is 
difficult to predict that results in 20 18 will be both efficient and financially beneficial to firms. 
As MIT authors Nicholas Ashford and Charles Caldart describe, "where permit markets are 
characterized by bilateral, sequential trades under conditions of imperfect information - rather 
than by multilateral, simultaneous trades under conditions of perfect information, as assumed by 
economic theory - participants often make early sub-optimal trades that considerably reduce 
future cost-saving opportunities'~~'Additionally, the US market for electricity from coal-burning 
power plants is a factor in the success of the cap and trade system. Twenty years from now, the 
national dependence on coal may lessen or increase, creating market changes that were not 
accounted for in the 2003 drafting of Clear Skies. 
Emission credit trading is an indirect control, as it is "an endeavor to induce the desired response 
through the creation of an economic in~entive '~."~he benefits of emissions trading are 
internalization of the cost of polluting and lowered emissions at a minimal cost. The main 
financial disincentive to emissions trading is that once a firm can meet new emissions standards 
and start banking unused emissions credits, it has little future incentive to further reduce 
emissions. 
As described by Ashford and Caldart in Environmental Law, Policy and Economics, there are 
three main types of permit systems. The first is an "ambient permit system," which is based on a 
series of pollution monitoring points. Each monitoring point is differentiated by pollution 
concentration and potential impact, and therefore receives a different number of permits for 
distribution. This system would create individual emission credit markets for each monitoring 
point. An "emissions permit system" assigns polluters to specific zones, who are allowed to trade 
with one another based on amount of emission. The main difference of this system is that it 
ignores different concentrations and characteristics of different pollutions within the zone. The 
"pollution offset system" is a combination of the two, which defines permits in terms of 
emissions but only allows for trading within a specific zone. In addition, there are air quality 
standards that must be met for each particular monitoring point. The mercury cap and trade 
program contains the additional feature of "non-degradation offset," which caps the national total 
of allowable emissions2'. ' 
After selection of the permit trading system, the two most important system features are the 
initial allocation of permits and the ability of firms to bank unused permits for future use. There 
are a number of concerns over allocating permits equitably. The Clear Skies Initiative would 
allocate permits similar to the Acid Rain reduction trading program in 1990, which summed the 
total pollution from each state and distributed permits accordingly to the state governments. It 
was then left to the states to distribute permits to firms, based on firm size and emission output. 
A stock of pennits was saved for new entrants to the industry, although required significant 
paperwork to be filed with the federal government before allocation. 
The financial incentive to reduce emissions is based on the ability of firms to bank unused 
permits for future use or sale. From evaluation of the Acid Rain program, banking of permits is 
very popular behavior among the power plant industry. The desire to bank permits for financial 
resale in the future leads to quick implementation of the emissions reduction standards, often 
meeting goals before schedule. However, the banking of permits creates a long-term disincentive 
to continue innovation and leads to potential slowing of the emissions reduction timeline, as 
firms are allowed to continue polluting at high levels until their pollution credits are used. Under 
a cap and trade program, the level of allowable emissions decreases as the national cap is 
lowered, so banked emission credits should eventually be used up. However, with current EPA 
caps set at very feasible levels, it is likely that firms will be able to bank and store credits for 
many years without having to innovate or upgrade pollution control technology. 
One of the main benefits of emission credit trading is the lowered cost burden on the 
Administration, since the system needs little oversight. However, for firms themselves, there 
may be high administrative costs in trying to identify a market for permits and negotiate the best 
price22. Competition between firms is also an important factor in the success of an emission 
credit trading market. Since over 25% of mercury emissions are from the three largest power 
companies in the US (American Electric Power, Southern Company, and Edison International), 
those firms have a competitive desire not to sell to each other and might potentially base their 
decisions on the predicted behavior of competitors23. The disinterest of firms to directly trade 
with one another has lead to the creation of third party mediators, who can buy and sell permits 
on the market for personal profit. This presents another criticism of cap and trade, as it allows 
third parties, rather than the federal government, to make a profit off pollution emissions. 
Section 4: The Clear Skies Initiative 
The Clear Skies Initiative was first announced by President Bush on February 14,2002. It was 
introduced to both chambers of Congress in the summer or 2002, but did not gather momentum. 
A modified version of the Clear Skies Act was reintroduced to Congress in late February 2003. It 
is this version that is still undergoing intense scrutiny from Congress, lawsuits from states and 
environmental groups, and an ongoing comment period from the EPA. Although the EPA issued 
the specific cap and trade rule for mercury in spring of 2005, it was returned to notice and 
comment period after receiving strong opposition from state governments. As of May 2006, the 
EPA was still accepting comments on the mercury rule. 
The Clear Skies Initiative mandates reductions of three air pollutants from electric utilities: 
mercury, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen oxide compounds. Each is individually held to a separate 
cap and trade system of pollution credits or allowances; however implementation of one 
pollution prevention technology is usually sufficient for capture of all three pollutants. Therefore, 
it is practical for utilities to either purchase additional allowances for the emission of all three 
pollutants, or install technology that will reduce emission of all three pollutants. 
Clear Skies anticipates two phases of reductions, one to start on January 1,20 10 and the other to 
start January 1, 20 18. The reduction levels at full implementation will be 69% reduction in 
mercury, 73% reduction in sulfur dioxide, and 67% reduction in NOx from 2000 emission levels. 
Figure 6 shows the reduction caps for the three pollutants under each phase, which are less 
stringent than the 90% reduction that would have been required under Section 1 12 MACT 
regulation. While Clear Skies applies to a number of utility plants and boilers that emit SOz and 
NOx, the mercury caps are limited to "all coal-fired units serving an electric generator with a 
nameplate capacity greater than 25 MW'~." For the purposes of this report, I will focus solely on 
mercury cap and trade, although the processes for SO2 and NOx are almost identical. 
1 
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i During each phase, the EPA determines the cap on total allowable mercury emissions in the 
nation. The EPA has already set this level to 26 tons starting in 20 10 (the second cap of 15 tons 
in 2018 is subject to adjustment by the EPA). Starting in 2010, the EPA will distribute, free of 
cost, 99% of mercury emission allowances. The remaining 1% of allowances will be available 
for purchase through an EPA auction. Each year for the next 20 year, the percentage of 
allowances available by auction will increase by another 1%. The percentage will then increase 
by 2.5% a year until finally all allowances are available by auction only and none are freely 
allocated to the utility industry? The initial allowances will be allocated based on "proportionate 
share of their baseline heat input to total heal input," with adjustments made for varying coal 
types2! Once distributed, allowances are under control of the electric utility, who can then 
decide to use the allowance and emit mercury, sell the allowance to a fellow utility, or bank the 
allowance for fbture use. There is no penalty for banking allowances and using them in following 
years. Because early allowances are freely distributed, they have a high value and industry has an 
incentive to reduce emissions in early years so that the allowances can be saved for future use. 
The Clear Skies Act includes a "safety-valve" provision to protect against market volatility. 
Under this provision, the price of a 1-pound mercury allowance is capped at $35,000. If the 
demand for allowances is so high that auction prices rise above this price, the EPA will borrow 
allowances from the following year's auction. While this ensures control of the market for the 
current year, the ability to borrow from future allowances presents an interesting scenario, 
especially since the EPA acknowledges that unless superior technology is developed to reduce 
mercury more inexpensively, "Clear Skies modeling suggests that the mercury safety valve price 
will be reached27." 
Figure 6: Clear Skies Air Pollutant Caps 
Source: US Environmental Protection Agency Clear Skies Page, http://www.epa.gov/air/clearskies/basic.html 
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Pollution technology such as advanced scrubbers, are able to collect a portion of particulate 
matter for all three pollutants. The EPA estimates that the first phase for mercury reduction will 
not present a challenge to the industry because reduction caps will already be met by plants 
installing technology to control for SO2 and NOx emissions. It is in the second phase of the 
mercury cap that firms may find it more cost-efficient to purchase allowances. An additional 
unknown in the Clear Skies program is the role of the states. Under the legislation, states cannot 
preempt Clear Skies but can require a specific facility to reduce emissions in response to local 
concerns. From existing legislation, it is clear that states do in fact wish to implement stricter 
controls of plants emitting mercury, and may use this provision as the loophole to forward their 
own regulatory programs. 
Section 5: Challenges of Cap and Trade 
The legality of regulating mercury under a cap and trade system and Section 11 1 is an important 
issue because if allowed, it will set a precedent for regulation of other hazardous air pollutants 
that might also gain exception from strict regulation. Aside fiom the legal debate, however, there 
is a larger policy question over the appropriateness of regulating mercury with emissions trading. 
Given the health risks associated with methylmercury exposure, there are a number of risks that 
might emerge under a cap and trade system that would not be present under MACT. Two of the 
central threats of cap and trade are the impacts on global strategies to regulate mercury and 
impacts on technology innovation within US industries. These potential challenges will be 
discussed more in depth in sections 8 and 10. However, it is important to note that discouraging 
innovation and challenging the global political community are not the only major risks 
associated with the decision to pursue cap and trade. This section will outline the other risks 
involved, which have been researched extensively and combine to make a strong argument 
against the new approach to regulation. Such risks divide into the broad categories of unequal 
risk of exposure and uncertainty over market and firm behavior. 
Unequal Risk and Exposure 
There are four ways to describe exposure to a toxic substance such as methylmercury: one-time, 
intermittent, periodic, and cont inuo~s~~.  Those who ingest methylmercury through consumption 
of fish are most likely subject to periodic exposure. This presents an increased risk to health, 
since the half-life of methylmercury can be up to 90 days when stored in body tissue, and 
periodic intake of a more frequent schedule would mean methylmercury accumulates in the 
bodJ9. This pattern of exposure and effect leads methylmercury to be categorized as having 
"traditional chronic toxicity." This categorization, developed by Ashford et al, is defmed as a 
"toxic process [that] typically proceeds to permanent damage over a time period from several 
days to several months, due to.. . reversible accumulation of a toxic agent3'." This definition also 
assumes that methylmercury damage is reversible since it can be excreted fiom the body, and 
thus allows for a threshold to be set below which no damage from exposure will occur. The EPA 
and National Research Council have confirmed this existence of a threshold by setting the 
reference dose of mercury for a healthy adult at 0.1 micrograms per kilogram of body weight per 
day. This reference dose, based on a threshold, does not consider those subsets of the population 
more chemically-sensitive to methylmercury. 
There are four meanings of the word exposure: initial exposure (amount in food), uptake 
(amount in the body), effective dose (amount at organs or places of concern), and molecular dose 
(amount likely to interact with a particular type of cell or gene on a molecular l e ~ e l ) ~ ' .  While the 
EPA reference dose for methylmercury exposure is an initial exposure amount, it is often more 
important to discuss exposure in terms of effective dose, which can do harm in the body. This is 
especially true when infants or those in chemically-sensitive groups are involved. The evidence 
that chemically-sensitive groups react differently to methylmercury comes from the study of 
active glutathione in autistic children, showing that certain children that do not have the 
metabolic system capabilities for ridding the body of mercury are more likely to experience ill 
health effects and have autistic traits. Such groups are not included on the distribution curve for 
effects of mercury exposure, and the EPA standard threshold and reference dose would not apply 
to them. Unfortunately, it is not known if these sensitive groups can safely ingest methylmercury 
at any dose, suggesting that a threshold and reference dose cannot be set, and that instead the 
EPA and industry should work to eliminate mercury emissions rather than capping them at a 
"safe" level. 
Perhaps most concerning of the risks of Clear Skies applied to mercury is the potential for the 
emergence of hot-spots. Hot-spots are localized areas of increased methylmercury deposition, 
usually located near emitting power plants or regions downwind of such plants. The EPA 
definition of "hot-spot" is a water source with "methylmercury fish tissue concentrations greater 
than 0.3 mg/kg, attributable solely to the utility3*." Usually they are caused from the location of 
several power plants in one geographic area. In order to capitalize on utilization of the power 
grid, many firms have several adjacent facilities or are located near one another. Instead of an 
equal distribution of power plants throughout the nation, they are concentrated in certain 
vulnerable areas. The Midwest is especially populated with coal-burning plants, with 49 power 
plants located in the Ohio River Areas with local plants are most at risk for 
concentrated mercury pollution, especially as plants are given the ability to maintain or increase 
pollution levels under cap and trade. Depending on individual firm behavior under cap and trade, 
mercury emissions could actually increase in some areas, creating a greater threat of hot-spots 
and more localized contamination than is already present. 
When the Clear Skies mercury rule was formally announced by the EPA in 2005, a number of 
federal and state EPA personnel immediately spoke out with their concerns over potential 
hotspots. John Paul, an EPA advisory co-Chair and Ohio regulator came out to the day after the 
Clear Skies announcement to admit b'hot-spots are a concern with me. I advise anyone who eats 
fish caught in a lake or stream near a power plant that they are at risk, and this rule will do 
nothing to protect them- and might make things worse34." Two days later, the Commissioner of 
the New Jersey Department of Environment Protection, Bradley Campbell, said "a cap and trade 
program for mercury further dilutes an already weak rule and create the risk of perpetuating 
dangerous mercury hot-spots that threaten the health of our communities and children35." 
While cap and trade will lower the overall nation emission of mercury and provide diffuse 
benefits to the nation as a whole, the potential for hot-spots places an extremely high 
environmental and health cost on a small localized minority of the population. This is a classic 
demonstration of Mancur Olson's ideas on collective action, in which diffuse benefits have 
concentrated costs36. As summarized by the OMB watch group: '"Those who live in hot-spot 
regions would share an unequal amount of the risk. Therefore, even if the cap and trade method 
does effectively reduce emissions overall, it is fhdamentally unfair because it does not equally 
distribute the burden of the pollution or the benefit of reduced emissions3'." Unfortunately for 
this small minority of Americans living in hot-spots, the owners of electric power generators 
have great political influence and lobbying power that is difficult to challenge. 
The EPA points to the success of the 1990's Acid Rain cap and trade program to argue that hot- 
spots will not emerge under Clear Skies cap and trade for mercury. The Acid Rain program was 
successful in many respects and considerably reduced sulfur dioxide in the US. The figure 
below, from EPA modeling, shows hot-spots prior to the Acid Rain program and again 10 years 
after the program was implemented. 
Figure 7: Hot-Spots under the Acid Rain Program 
1989 -1 Wl 
Source: US Environmental Agency, htt~://www.epa.nov/air/clearskies/ca~trade.html 
However, using the Acid Rain program as the sole basis for prediction that no mercury hot-spots 
will emerge once Clear Skies is enacted is a weak argument. There are a number of important 
differences between the properties of mercury and sulfur dioxide that make them very different 
types of air pollutants. The first different is the weight of each pollutant. Mercury is almost three 
times heavier than sulfur dioxide, and thereby more likely to deposit regionally around the 
source of emission. Another distinction is the vast difference in the half-life for each of the 
pollutants. While the half-life of sulfur dioxide in the atmosphere is only a few days, the half-life 
of elemental mercury in the atmosphere is approximately one year38. Thus, mercury is more 
likely to accumulate in streams and soil once deposited, increasing the likeliness of the 
emergence of hot-spots. A final important distinction between the two is their means of exposure 
and resulting health effects once taken into the human body. Sulfur dioxide is largely inhaled, 
resulting in a number of potential lung diseases and respiratory problems. Methylmercury, 
however, is ingested through the consumption of food, and has' the health impacts of neurological 
damage, especially on a developing fetus. While the health effects of sulfur dioxide can usually 
be linked to the pollutant, the health effects of mercury remain controversial and scientifically 
difficult to determine. As such, it is often easier to prevent against a known pollutant that is 
inhaled, either through improved home ventilation or filters. However, methylmercury is often 
consumed unknowingly from the food chain, and is much more difficult to prevent, except 
through the banning of eating fish, which even if politically feasible in the US, is unlikely to be 
enforced in poor communities that fish. Once methylmercury enters the body, its long half-life 
distinguished it once again as a particularly harmll  toxin, as often has a half-life of up to 90 
days when stored in tissue. 
Modeling of local depositions of mercury near power plants emitting the pollutant shows the 
potential for localized hot-spots. Those states with multiple coal-fired plants are especially at 
risk. Figure 8 demonstrates those states whose hot-spots are largely created from in-state 
emissions of mercury. The data is consistent with plant location data, as well as predicted 
downwind effects, showing that the majority of East Coast states are at risk. The Director of the 
Natural Resources Defense Council, John Wake, has estimated that Clear Skies might result in 
increased mercury emissions by 84 1 % in California, 176% in Colorado, 24 1 % in New 
Hampshire, and 56% in New Jersey, based on internal studies of current mercury emissions in 
those states as well as the distribution of coal-fired power plants39. 
Figure 8: Local Mercury Hot-Spots 
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Marginalization of Population Subgroups 
The charge given to the EPA by Congress is to "protect human health and the environment." By 
awarding free emission credits to polluters, the EPA is instead protecting the best interests of 
industry and certain users of electricity. The beneficiaries of the cap and trade system are power 
plants themselves and citizens located far from plant facilities, who face no risk of exposure fiom 
hot-spots. The very people needing protection from mercury in the first place are those that 
become most at risk under the mercury cap and trade program that was devised to protect them. 
Certainly most at risk for exposure to methylmercury are developing fetuses and infants, or the 
chemically-sensitive adult population. However, there is another group left susceptible to 
methylmercury exposure, not because of age or health, but socio-economic status. Communities 
in coastal or lake areas that rely on fish consumption as part of a daily diet are at high risk. In 
September 2001, Brookhaven National Laboratories released a study on the elevated 
methylmercury levels in geographic regions of the US. The study concluded that "there is a 
special concern pertaining to subsistence fishers or recreational anglers that consume large 
amounts of freshwater fish. These groups of people represent the high exposure cases that form 
the tail of the distribution of the general population40." Testing in the Southeastern US, with a 
large conglomerate of coal-fired plants, found that mercury levels in hair samples were 10 times 
higher than in the general population, corresponding to elevated risk. Increasing the danger of 
methylmercury exposure to those living in fishing communities is their dependence on fish 
consumption. Often such communities are lower-income and not able to purchase store-bought 
food products. Those living in fishing communities are also least likely to have the mobility to 
move and change careers, due to fewer resources. This is especially problematic in developing 
nations, where diets are more dependent on fish. Fish accounts for up to 25% of the protein in the 
diet of those living in Asia, as well as 17% of the protein for those living in ~ f r i c a ~ ' .  
Similarly, the most at risk group to methylmercury exposure in the general population also lacks 
the ability for movement away from potential hot-spots. Pregnant women who live in areas 
surrounding power plants have a higher risk of hot-spot exposure to their unborn child. However, 
when pregnant and expecting a child, women do not have the mobility to change locations and 
leave their existing social networks and family that are needed for support. Therefore, the most 
at-risk groups left in at-risk areas are those from lower incomes, the elderly, children, and 
pregnant women. Each of these does not have a strong advocacy voice, so their concerns go 
unheard in Congress and at the EPA. This reinforces their marginalization and contributes to the 
even greater risk of not being able to represent themselves to challenge regulation. Also 
concerning is a recent CDC study that found white non-Hispanic children to have lower levels of 
mercury in their blood than Hispanic- American children and African-American children. Further 
research is still needed to determine if this is a result of regional living patterns and the increased 
probability for these groups to live near hot-spots, or if they are genetically more likely to 
accumulate and store methylmercury42. 
Market Uncertainty 
Market-based regulation always carries some inherent risk due to the volatility of markets. In the 
formulation of Clear Skies, the EPA anticipated firm and market behavior for the next 20 years. 
Many of the predictions for firm behavior and market activity were drawn from the Acid Rain 
Program of the 1990s, expanding the extrapolation of market behavior over 30 years. The basis 
for EPA's decision to favor cap and trade regulations was based entirely on cost-benefit analyses 
that spanned the lifetime of the program. All predictions that cap and trade will lower emissions 
rely on the assumption that the price of emission allowances will make technological 
improvements in mercury a favorable economic decision. Local markets, inflation, and 
increasing strains on the US electric power supply will all affect the cost of emission permits. 
Since firms can only be expected to favor least-cost alternatives, there is no guarantee that the 
cost of permits will be higher than the cost of installing technology, thus creating a potential 
increase in mercury emissions in certain areas. 
The uncertainty of predicting emissions markets was demonstrated in late April 2006 with the 
sudden crash of the International carbon market, which is used to trade pollution credits for C 0 2  
in the European Union. The crash occurred after several European nations reported better than 
expected reductions in carbon emissions. The resulting impact was an immediate 50% drop in 
the price of credits themselves, which is expected to fall even lower. As of early May 2006, the 
crash has resulted in a US $50 billion loss in value of the trading market43. 
As equally unpredictable as the market for emission permits is the uncertainty over firms' 
behavior under Clear Skies. As markets are never perfect, individual and firm behavior is not 
always rational. In a 2002 study of the federal Acid Rain Program effects in Florida and firms' 
strategic decisions to control SO1 emissions, Academic John Swinton found that "power plants in 
Florida did not use the allowance market to its fullest potential: several plants are controlling 
emissions when purchasing allowances would be a more economic option44." Making rational 
decisions whether to use allowances or improve technology requires significant administrative 
overhead and costs on the part of electric utilities and individual plant managers. 
Under George Stigler's definition of regulatory capture, institutional failure is a result of the 
regulated using the regulations to limit competition and create barriers to entry. Cap and trade is 
not only industry-friendly because it gives decision making power over whether or not to pollute 
to firms, but it also gives power to industry players over one another. Since competing firms are 
directly connected in trading emission credits, they have the ability to exert power over 
competitors in terms of how many credits they sell and to whom. Large firms have a greater 
ability to exert power over smaller firms, who probably do not have the financial choice to either 
innovate or use credits, but are more financially and organizationally inclined to one position. 
The argument can be made that the first years of Clear Skies appear as a reward system, rather 
than a control strategy. There are a number of utility firms who already meet mercury emission 
standards and implement clean technologies for a variety of reasons, perhaps due to a state 
regulation or a conscious decision to be environmentally-friendly. Allocating these firms' 
unneeded emissions credits equates to a cash allowance. Including them in the cap and trade 
program allows them to enter the system with a competitive advantage, leading to a number of 
institutional failures. However, the irony is that to not award allowances to firms that already 
control mercury emissions would be to punish first-movers and those concerned about 
environmental impact. 
This market uncertainty raises serious questions as to whether Clear Skies will accomplish its 
primary goal, which is to reduce mercury emissions by encouraging advancements in technology 
to aid in mercury capture and pollution prevention. Section 8 addresses this question, applying 
lessons learned from the Acid Rain cap and trade program to evaluate how firrn behavior might 
deviate from technological innovation anticipated by its promoters under Clear Skies. 
Section 6: The Move towards Market-based Regulation 
If 1 in 8 women living in the US has dangerous level of mercury in her blood, if it is proven that 
mercury is llnked to a number of fatal neurological diseases, and if cap and trade is not only less 
effective than previously thought but also more costly, why then does mercury regulation under 
Clear Skies receive as much support as it does from the Bush Administration? To answer this, 
there are a number of explanations for the current Administration's overall tendency to favor 
market-based regulatory instruments over the traditional command-and-control approach 
outlined in the statute of the Clean Air Act. While the use of market-based environmental policy 
is not unique to the George W. Bush Administration, his Administration is credited with favoring 
economic regulatory schemes almost exclusively and at the expense of potentially successful 
command-and-control standards for environmental protection. This section will explore two 
theories that attempt to explain the Administration's preference for cap and trade, especially in 
light of academic and epidemiological studies questioning the success of cap and trade under the 
Clear Skies Initiative. 
First, we must ask whether the shift towards market-based regulations is historically based, 
building from Congressional and Executive decisions from the past two decades. Instead of 
viewing market-based regulation as a preference of this Administration, this theory credits past 
Congressional procedural mandates and executive orders, such as the mandated use of cost- 
benefit analysis and use of the Office or Management and Budget, as the originating basis for the 
pressure to use market-based environmental regulations. Alternatively, is there something unique 
about the culture of the Bush administration that favors electric utility industry interests and 
disregards respected academic studies suggesting that a strict environmental approach is 
necessary for adequate protection of human health? To explore the current Administrative 
culture, it is necessary to explore the relationship between the Administration and industry firms 
through records of political contributions. Coupled with financial donating power of the utility 
industry is the historical power of utility lobbyists in Washington and the US cultural of catering 
to certain industry interests. The final question that arises in evaluating the political cultural of 
the Bush Administration is whether there exists a conscious and intentional decision to disregard 
the environmental protocols of the international community. Can the US reluctance to regulate 
mercury in the same decisive manner as the international community be seen as simply another 
example of an Administrative culture determined to stand independently? 
These questions must be asked in order to understand how the Bush Administration, Congress, 
EPA, and industry have interpreted crucial studies comparing cap and trade and MACT for 
controlling mercury. Understanding the Administrative culture and historical context of 
regulatory policy describes the lens through which mercury regulation is viewed by those with 
decision-making power. 
Historical Shifts 
When the Environmental Protection Agency was created in 1970, it marked the start of a decade 
in which the federal government was dedicated to strict regulation of industry in order to protect 
the environment and human health. Specific standards were written into the Clean Air Act of 
1970 by Congress. What followed was a flurry of activity from the EPA and other agencies to 
reverse risk-prone industry practices through setting both specific technology requirements and 
emission output limitations. The Courts recognized agencies' abilities to regulate even in the 
event of scientific uncertainty, often favoring the Precautionary Principle in allowing a strict 
regulatory decision to prevent possible harm in the absence of concrete scientific evidence. In 
later decades however, ambitious social goals to protect human health and the environment were 
compromised by requiring the agencies to undertake regulatory impact analyses, forcing 
agencies to precisely quantify health benefits and justify regulation with a positive net cost- 
benefit analysis. 
There were two major political decisions that caused the shift from social analysis to cost-benefit 
analysis of environmental regulation. Although Presidents of the late 2oth century frequently used 
the power of executive orders to shape their executive regulatory oversight capacity, action taken 
by President Reagan stands as one of the more significant changes in major regulatory 
policymaking in the US. In the first month of President Reagan's term in 198 1, he signed an 
executive order than has since changed the role of the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB). Under Reagan the OMB grew from managing the federal budget to an Office charged 
with the responsibility of performing an analysis of all major federal regulatory proposals. 
President Clinton backed this expanded function of the OMB and introduced economic analysis 
with Executive Order 12866, which required the OMB the perform a cost-benefit analysis45. 
Based entirely on this financial analysis, OMB then makes recommendations on which programs 
should be included in the federal budget, without any review of the science behind each 
regulation. 
A second major change in making regulatory policy occurred in the 1990's under Speaker Newt 
Gingrich's "Contract with America." Included in his concept of regulatory reform was expanded 
Congressional oversight of agencies and the requirement that agencies perform in-house cost- 
benefit analyses for all major regulatory programs. Additionally, the Regulatory Flexibility Act 
required agencies to examine cost-effectiveness of regulatory alternatives. These requirements 
further pressure agencies to select the lowest-cost regulation, often at the cost of impact and 
performance, for the sake of gaining Congressional budget approval. 
With an institutional pressure within agencies to overemphasize financial costs and select lowest- 
cost regulatory schemes, environmental market-based regulations materialize as the most rational 
decision. By looking at the gradual shift towards emphasis on costs of regulations, the Bush 
Administration's choice of cap and trade mercury regulation could be view not as a directed 
political decision, but instead the result of evolving trends in US environmental policy. However 
the extent of the use of cost-benefit analysis within the OMB and EPA is a function of political 
decisions of the Administration and raises serious questions over politics influencing crucial 
mercury reduction policy. 
Political Influence 
The manner in which the OMB and EPA carried out cost-benefit analyses for regulating mercury 
under Clear Skies is particularly interesting and telling of the channels for political influence. In 
an article for the Environmental Law Institute, academics Lisa Heinzerling and Rena Steinzor 
detail the relationship between the EPA and OMB in performing mercury cap and trade cost- 
benefit analyses and the political influences on each According to Heinzerling and 
Steinzor, both the EPA and OMB neglected to evaluate regulatory alternatives to cap and trade, 
although such practice is mandated by Congress. Additionally, neither organization attempted to 
quantify the benefits of reducing mercury emissions, resulting in a hugely erroneous cost-benefit 
analysis in favor of cap and trade. The specific oversights made in economic evaluation will be 
addresses in more detail in Section 7 of this report. 
On the EPA side, Heinzerling and Steinzor found evidence in the public record that EPA career 
personnel were directed not to consider or evaluate alternative regulatory strategies for mercury 
outside of cap and trade47. When questioned publicly about this in 2003, the then EPA 
Administrator Mike Leavitt told the press he would direct his staff to evaluate alternative 
policies. But as the authors discovered, "within days, EPA Assistant Administrator Jeffrey 
Holmstead, the chief architect of the controversial scheme, reassured the utility industry that 
such reconsideration would be limited to details of the trading system's design, as opposed to a 
comprehensive reevaluation of the soundness of EPA's overall approach4'." 
As the Office within the OMB charged with implementing executive order 12866, the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) should have caught the EPA's mistake of not 
performing alternative cost-benefit analyses for other regulatory strategies. Instead, "OIRA did 
not require EPA to look at more alternatives, nor did it even require EPA to prepare a formal 
regulatory impact analysis of the kind usually required for such a major After searching 
the massive public record on mercury regulation, Heinzerling and Steinzor could find no place 
where OIRA ever questioned the EPA's lacking cost-benefit analysis or mention of alternative 
more stringent regulatory policies. Another disturbing occurrence was the authors' finding that 
OIRA (despite having no scientific or medical expertise) recommended that the EPA use the 
word "possible" before describing health effects of mercury exposure5'. 
The negligence of the OMB and EPA in their performing cost-benefit analyses of the proposed 
mercury regulation is now a key point in legislation calling for the District Courts to stop to the 
Clear Skies legislation. But it also raises and interesting point about the use of cost-benefit 
analysis and relationship between OMB and regulatory agencies. Additionally, the question 
remains: From which source did the political pressure to push through Clear Skies originate? 
Political Contributions 
The US political cycle is dependent on exuberate amounts of campaign contributions from 
industry corporations. In return, the US political cultural is one in which elected officials are 
beholden to industry interests and influence from lobbyists. This creates a slew of complicated 
relationships between industry leaders and elected officials from both political parties. While the 
political influence of industry is acknowledged and practically essential for a successful election 
campaign, it is simultaneously discouraged for replacing influential scientific and economic 
policy evidence with political influence. The sudden dismissal of the Clinton Administration 
MACT proposal for mercury raises a number of questions over such political influence and the 
tendency of the Bush Administration to favor industry interests. In a 2003 PBS NewsHour 
interview with then EPA Administrator Mike Leavitt, Margaret Warner quotes the New York 
Times in questioning this view, saying "The reversal came right out of the Karl Rove play book, 
a long promised payoff to President Bush's big contributors in the utility industry5'." 
Electric power utilities have the largest concentrated stake in federal mercury regulations, as the 
sole bearer of compliance costs to reduce mercury emissions. Interestingly, that industry also has 
a powerhl and long-standing monetary relationship with Presidential candidates. In 1999, the 
thirty largest electric utility companies, whom all own power plants on the "50 Dirtiest" list, 
gave a combined $6.6 million to the Bush campaign and Republican National Committee. 
Edison Electric Institute, the professional association for electric utilities, had ten individual 
employees who rose over $1.5 million in contributions for the Bush campaign. 
Political contributions are not a new concept in the US or an exclusively Republican activity. As 
mentioned, they are a necessary entity for finding a successfkl political campaign. The real 
question is exactly what is bought for industry interests through a political contribution as large 
as $6 million. In a 2004 Public Citizen Congress Watch report, a note from EEI President 
Thomas Kuhn to the Bush campaign is quoted, with Kuhn asking that the Bush campaign track 
incoming donations solicited by his company in order to "ENSURE THAT OUR INDUSTRY IS 
CREDITED" [emphasis in original15*. The Public Citizen report recounts that EEI was then 
allowed to meet with Vice President Cheney's Energy Taskforce 17 times before legislation 
affecting them was writted3. 
Regardless of the dollar amount contributed to the President's campaign, the electric utility 
industry is one of the oldest and most influential in DC. Given that the nation's lifestyle and 
industry is dependent on a constant source of uninterrupted electricity, this industry has 
inevitable influence over leaders. Beginning with the Industrial Revolution, the US has created a 
national identity built on productivity, which has awarded power plants unique political 
influence in the US. Electric utility lobbyists have the advantage of a long history of mutual 
relationships in Congress, in addition to the cultural influence they retain. As the main 
component of US livelihood and quality of life, the electric power industry has a seemingly 
justified place as one of the most important industry groups, one that Congress and the 
Presidency feels the necessity to appease. 
Section 7: Economics of Cap and Trade 
Cap and trade regulation was selected by the EPA for the sole reason that it has the potential to 
reduce mercury emissions for a fraction of the cost of command-and-control. This assumption 
was based on agency cost-benefit analyses, as well as looking at compliance data from the Acid 
Rain cap and trade program of the 1990's. Figure 9 shows the EPA's calculated economic 
impacts for MACT and cap and trade. As shown, the annual net benefits from MACT were 
assumed to be $13 billion, which those for cap and trade were over $55 billion. The costs for cap 
and trade also include control technology that might be installed for purposes of meeting the 
Clean Air Interstate Rule (a program for SO2 and NOx), which would have a secondary benefit 
of capturing a certain percentage of mercury particulates as well. This figure however does not 
include health related costs or benefits. Also not shown in a simple cost-benefit analysis is that 
while cap and trade costs and health costs will continue each year, the costs for MACT is 
generally a one-time cost of installing mercury capture technology. 
Figure 9: EPA Cost Benefit Analysis for Mercury Regulation 
Table 1: Estimated Annual Economic Impacts of EPA's Proposed Mercury Policy 
Options in 201 0 
1999 dollars, in billions 
Policy option Annual costs Annual benefits" Annual net benefits 
15 or more 13 or more 
Cap-and-trade Not estimated Not estimated Not estimated 
option 
Technology-bas Not estimated Not estimated Not estimated 
ed option and 
the interstate 
rule 
Cap-and-trade 3 to 5 or moreb 58 to 73 or moreb 55 to 68 or moreb 
option and the 
interstate rule 
Source. EPA. 
"As discussed further below. EPA's monetary benefits estimates do not include the human health 
benefits specifically related to reductions in mercury emissions. Instead. EPA monetized some of the 
health benefits that would occur as a secondary benefit of regulating mercury. 
bAccording to EPA. the lower end of the range reflects a scenario involving no additional reductions 
beyond those achieved by the interstate rule, while the upper end of the range reflects mercury caps 
similar to those in the Clear Skies legislation. EPA estimated that the interstate rule alone would 
generate annual benefits of $58 billion or more while imposing annual costs of about $3 billion. 
Source: US Environmental Protection Agency, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05252.pdf 
In addition to the numerous health effects and other factors that challenge the validity of cap and 
trade mercury regulations, many argue that the cost-benefit analysis showing cap and trade to be 
more inexpensive was flawed. Lisa Heinzerling and Rena Steinzor on behalf of the 
Environmental Law Institute have examined all EPA and OMB public records looking at the 
actions leading up to the announcement of Clear Skies, and found that "neither EPA officials not 
the.. . economists at the Office of Management and budget asked whether we might get an even 
more wonderful cost-benefit profile if we regulated mercury more stringently." They claim that 
the EPA neglected to look at newer technologies that would make MACT more obtainable and 
achieve greater benefits in a short amount of time, cutting costs. Such concerns were brought to 
the EPA's attention by its own Office of Research and Development, who concluded that by 
201 0 technology could reduce up to 90% of mercury emissions54. In response to external 
pressure, then Administrator Mike Leavitt promised additional cost-benefit analyses be 
conducted. This action was never taken, however, as Assistant Administrator Jeffrey Holmstead 
kept his alleged promises to industry leaders and instead had additional analyses be "limited to 
details of the trading system's design, as opposed to a comprehensive reevaluation of the 
soundness of EPA's overall approach55." The reluctance of the EPA to closely perform a cost- 
benefit analysis for each mercury regulatory alternative should have been resolved by direction 
from the OMB to perform such analysis. Under Executive Order 12866, the EPA was mandated 
consider all alternative regulatory approaches. Strangely enough, and in contrast with their 
actions on almost all other major legislation, the OMB did not require this analysis from the EPA 
nor did it perform this analysis themselves. 
In the limited cost benefit analysis that did take place for the cost-effectiveness of cap and trade, 
there is significant cause to believe that the EPA left out crucial data that may have changed the 
outcome. Before announcing the cap and trade strategy to regulate mercury, the EPA 
commissioned a cost-benefit analysis on methylmercury health effects to be conducted at 
Harvard University, which was then peer-reviewed and sent to the agency. The Harvard study 
found that instead of the $50 million reported by the EPA, the cost savings through health 
benefits associated with stringent command-and-control regulation would be approximately $5 
billion each year. According to sources of the Washington Post, "top agency officials ordered the 
finding stripped from public do~uments'~." In response to why the Harvard data was not 
included in EPA analysis, the agency said that it received the study too late to include it in 
findings. Records show however, that the study was delivered to the EPA before the EPA 
deadline. The co-author of the study, James Hammitt, the director of the Harvard Center for Risk 
Analysis, commented on the impact of his results, saying "if you have a larger effect of the 
benefits that would suggest more aggressive controls were j~s t i f i ed~~."  
In an additional study evaluating the cost of methylmercury exposure through health impacts in. 
the US, physicians Trasande, Landrigan, and Schechter calculated the annual cost to the US fiom 
lost worker productivity due to early-life methylmercury damage. The authors use EPA reference 
dose amounts and results fiom the Faroes Island Study to conclude that a doubling of exposure to 
methylmercury would result in an approximate loss of 1.5 IQ points. This reduction in IQ was 
related to lifetime productivity and a loss in total lifetime income. Overall, the authors estimate 
that the loss in IQ in American children from methylmercury to be worth $8.7 billion annually. 
However, the study accurately notes that not all methylmercury exposure is a direct result of 
mercury emissions from coal-fired power plants and uptake through fish consumption. The 
authors estimate that 33% of the US'S 158 total tons of anthropogenic mercury are deposited in 
the US, along with an additional 35 tons of mercury from global sources. 41% of these total 
anthropogenic deposits can be attributed to emissions from coal-fired power plants. When taking 
this into account, $1.3 billion annually in lost productivity of Americans can be attributed 
directly to US coal-fired power plant mercury emissions5'. This cost was completely overlooked 
in the EPA cost-benefit analysis of mercury regulations. 
Section 8: Regulatory Effects on Innovation 
One way to evaluate the success and effects of a regulation is to study its impact on industry 
behavior. Although cost effectiveness and protecting from environmental harms and health 
threats are the main criterion on which to judge environmental regulation, additional metrics 
exist to study the regulation's impact on industrial processes. An often overlooked side effect of 
any environmental regulation is its ability to change industrial operations, either through creation 
of new technology or new organizational procedures and processes. The environmental 
regulation serves as a catalyst for this change, which can affect productivity, workforce 
dynamics, and has an impact on industry compliance with future regulations. Since the 
announcement of the Clear Skies Initiative, academics have responded with harsh criticism and 
cite numerous evidence of the potential health hazards and costs of the market-based regulation. 
What is missing, however, is an expansion of this discuss to include the potential future impact 
of Clear Skies on the evolution of productivity, efficiency, and technology within electric power 
plants. To address the likely impact of cap and trade mercury regulation, it is useful to measure 
national efficiency by anticipating the nature of changes in technological innovation. This 
section will do just that, by exploring the concepts of innovation, using innovation under the 
Acid Rain Program as a case study, and examining theoretical arguments over the role of market- 
based vs. command-and-control regulation for encouraging innovation. 
lnnova tion 
Innovation can be defined as "the deployment of a new way to perform a functions9." This 
differs from the concepts of invention, which is the first development or creation of a new 
process or product, and diffusion, which is the widespread commercialization of the new 
development. Innovation rests between these two actions and involves not only the discovery of 
a new technology, but its availability on the market6'. Innovation is the appropriate measure of 
development of new technology, providing more insight than either changes in invention or 
diffusion. Since the majority of patented inventions never make it to market, the potential of their 
development is never realized and can not have any impact on firm behavior, industrial 
processes, or the market. Products already achieving widespread diffusion are not an accurate 
measure of the impacts of regulation on technological productivity because such products have 
already impacted industry behavior and the market, and cannot be considered solely as a direct 
result of regulation. In the case of mercury emission reductions, it is commercially available new 
products that promise reductions in mercury in a new manner that constitute innovation. 
There is another distinction between types of innovation that must be made. It is easiest to think 
of innovation in the reduction of mercury as having three potential forms: technological, process, 
and cultural/social. The first is the development of advanced end-of-pipe technology for mercury 
emission capture, such as advanced scrubbers or injection of a solvent. Alternatively, innovation 
can occur within the process, with a complete overhaul of the technology used in coal-fired 
plants so that the mercury by-product is a nonexistent problem. This might involve changing 
significant components of the plant so that the flue gas stream does not contain mercury. A third 
type of innovation could occur at the cultural level. Changes in societal views on power 
production or industry decisions to lessen dependence on coal would result in more alternative 
energy generating sources, alleviating the problem of mercury emission from coal-fired plants. 
Ultimately such cultural change will be necessary to completely reduce the levels of mercury and 
other hazardous air pollutants routinely emitted in the generation of energy. While one could 
argue that this ambitious goal should be the objective of the Clear Skies Initiative and Clean Air 
Act, it unfortunately is not a legislative charge given to the EPA and such legislation is primarily 
concerned with end-of-pipe technology improvements to reduce emissions. Certainly source 
polluters could opt to make process changes to reduce mercury pollution, but there is little 
incentive for this kind of radical innovation in the Clear Skies Initiative. Only the option for 
innovation waivers under Clean Air Act Section 11 1 J would encourage this dramatic change, 
although they have been used "sparingly by the EPA, both because industry has been unsure of 
their application and because the agency has not encouraged their use," according to authors 
Ashford and caldart6'. The historically limited use of innovation waivers means that electric 
utility owners are unlikely to utilize the existing system or press for expansion of the innovation 
waiver program. As such, this thesis will focus on innovation as it relates to development of 
advanced mercury control technology, working within the assumption that emitters have little 
interest in utilizing incentives to innovate through other means. 
Innovation is a means to evaluate efficiency of both a firm and a regulation. Efficiency can be 
viewed as either static or dynamic. Because most decisions and evaluations are made considering 
current existing and available technology, static efficiency is most often discussed, which does 
not account for continual innovative changes in technology. In contrast, dynamic efficiency is 
the ability of technology to change over time. It often occurs in response to environmental 
regulation since firms are given an incentive to reduce production costs through compliance to 
the regulation through a more cost effective technology. A basic definition of static efficiency 
and dynamic efficiency are provided by Ashford and Caldart as "whether a particular policy 
instrument can achieve environmental objectives using existing technology at minimum cost" 
and "the extent to which a particular policy instrument has the potential to induce technological 
change to reduce environmental and human risk," respectively62. As explained by academic 
Dallas Burtraw, "dynamic efficiency is achieved by providing firms with an incentive to 
innovate, because firms can expect to keep some or all of the gains from innovation through 
reduced abatement costs plus reduced payments for taxes or One of the major flaws 
of cost-benefit analysis is that it can only consider projected improvements in efficiency of 
current technology, and not those that might actually be realized over time and greatly improve 
both efficiency and cost savings. It is important to note that while incentives for innovation will 
typically result in dynamic efficiency, regulations with the sole objective to reach better [static] 
efficiency will not necessarily do so by innovation64. This leads us to the central question posed 
in this section: Does Clear Skies encourage innovation and how does that compare to the 
potential innovation that would occur under a more stringent command-and-control regulatory 
program? 
To address whether Clear Skies will enhance innovation within industry, I examine innovation 
under the Acid Rain Program as a close case study. While sulfur dioxide and mercury are 
incompatible comparisons when discussing health risks and environmental threats, it is an 
appropriate case study when looking at firm behavior and also when evaluating the theoretical 
arguments about innovation under market-based regulations. Before delving into this case study, 
it is interesting to examine the most recent innovations for mercury capture, which suggest that 
technological innovation is both technologically and economically feasible, and likely to expand 
if given the incentive under the appropriate regulation. 
Emerging Technologies 
Anticipating the impacts on innovation of either command-and-control or cap and trade 
regulatory strategies is a difficult task, since regulation typically precedes technological 
innovation. Additionally, costs of implementing technologies tend to decrease after regulations 
are mandated, since the regulations provide motivation for innovation and incentives for 
development of more efficient technologies. Thus, the most successful environmental regulations 
in encouraging innovation will set strict levels on emissions, allowing industries to meet the 
standards through any technological means necessary. 
As described by Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM), there are 
two types of mercury end-of-pipe control technologies, those that specifically target capture of 
mercury pollutants, and those that target capture other pollutants but are successful in the 
unintentional reduction of mercury particulates as well. Aiding in the widespread reduction of 
mercury emissions is the potential for co-benefits or incidental benefits from technology 
designed to reduce emission of NOx and SO:. Both prior legislation and the provisions in the 
Clear Skies Initiative for NOx and SO2 will require that coal-fired plants install technology to 
collect and prevent release of those pollutants. The preferred methods of capture, including wet 
and dry scrubbers, baghouses, electrostatic precipitators, and selective catalytic reduction, will 
have the additional benefit of collecting a percentage of mercury  emission^^^. Coal-fired power 
plants already in operation with dry scrubbers and baghouses collect approximately 95% of 
mercury from bituminous coal and 74-86% of subbituminous coal unintentionally? Therefore, 
the required cost of technology to specifically reduce mercury particles will be substantially less 
than accounted for by the EPA and OMB in their cost benefit analysis of MACT. Small additions 
to already successful technologies that reduce mercury emissions would be enough to satisfy a 
command-and-control regulation requiring 90% reduction in mercury emission. 
There are a number of newly developed techniques for mercury capture, currently tested through 
industry partnerships with the US Department of Energy (DOE) or academic institutions. The 
National Energy Technology Laboratory, within the DOE'S Office of Fossil Energy, is the 
largest source of funding for mercury technology pilot programs. The goals of the program are to 
evaluate new technology that would reduce mercury emissions from coal-fired power plants by 
50-70% at a price 25% lower than current cost estimates, as well as reduce mercury emissions by 
90% in 201 0. While a number of innovative technologies are funded for testing, the basis of the 
program includes full-scale testing of two emerging technologies: enhances wet scrubbing and 
sorbent injection6'. The success of these projects suggests that mercury capture is more feasible 
than previously thought by the EPA, suggesting that the caps set under Clear Skies are too 
lenient and would probably be feasible without substantial technology upgrades or innovation. 
There are a number of potentially successful technologies for capturing mercury pollution as it 
leaves the power plant as flue gas. A brief summary of the leading technologies, as determined 
by successful DOE pilot programs, is provided below. 
Activated Carbon Injection (ACI) 
This technology includes the injection of dry powdered activated carbon in the stream of flue gas 
between the pre-heater and electrostatic precipitator or baghouse, at extremely high 
temperatures. Since no specific hardware is required and a process change or the existing control 
technology is not necessary, this is a relatively inexpensively option68. The DOE has funded full- 
scale tests of this technology in four US power plants. Results indicate that across a range of coal 
fuel types and types of existing controls, the efficiency of ACI can range between 60 to 90% 
reduction in mercury emissionsh9. The highest capture rate was achieved with use of a baghouse 
in place of electrostatic precipitation. Although requiring a higher capital cost, the use of a 
baghouse instead of electrostatic precipitation for mercury reduction has an expected payback 
period of only 3-4 years. 
The success of ACI has been proven commercially from its widespread adoption by the 
municipal waste combustion industry, which has been regulated for mercury emissions for the 
past several years. There are some differences between the municipal waste and coal-fired power 
plants, in that the volume of flue gas is higher at power plants and the percentage of mercury 
particles in the stream is lower. However, many researchers believe that ACI in coal-fired boilers 
is only a question of technology transfer and will require little in the way of new research. The 
challenges with the technology are the disposal of activated carbon and its potential to become 
emitted with the flue gas. 
Enhanced Wet Scrubbing 
This process seeks to improve performance of mercury removal by the existing scrubber by 
oxidizing elemental mercury in the flue gas before it reaches the scrubber. There are a number of 
methods to promote oxidation, including injection of a chemical reagent or catalyst. In the two 
ongoing DOE full-scale tests of enhanced wet scrubbing, mercury reductions ranged between 50- 
80% reduced emissions70. Additional programs will help refine the chemical reaction procedure. 
Selective Catalytic Reduction, SCR 
Selective Catalytic Reduction is a common technology used to eliminate or reduce NOx from a 
flue gas stream. It involves adding a reducing agent that can be absorbed onto a catalyst and 
reacted with the NOx, converting it to nitrogen and water in the presence of oxygen. Recent 
research has suggested that SCR can provide the co-benefit of aiding in reduction of mercury 
emission. Results from a large-scale study of SCR in the Netherlands suggest that when 
combined with electrostatic precipitation (ESP) and flue gas desulphurization (FGD), SCR can 
yield a 90% reduction in mercury emissions, as compared with a 75% mercury reduction from 
ESP and FGD alone71. 
Especially important to remember that these three promising technologies were mainly 
developed in response to standards set for SO2 and NOx, with later research leading to the 
discovery of their effectiveness for mercury capture. Until required to find alternatives for 
mercury capture under stringent regulatory standards, the industry is unlikely to innovate to its 
full potential. True reduction in mercury will come years after mandatory compliance through a 
regulatory standard. If that standard is not in place, what is feasible and available today may still 
be the baseline efficiency when cap and trade reaches its final phase in 201 8. While the DOE 
programs to test new technology are helphl in determining what is feasible, widespread 
innovation and diffusion comes only from regulatory and market forces. 
Acid Rain Case Study 
Program Overview and Success 
The Acid Rain Program was developed as part Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1990, which allowed for the regulation of sulfur dioxide emissions to take place under a cap and 
trade emission credits trading system. Much like Clear Skies, the program involved two phases 
for the targeted reduction of sulfur dioxide. Phase I began in 1995 and required compliance only 
from 1 10 existing power plants with a generating capacity greater than 100 megawatts, most of 
them located in the  idw west^'. Phase I1 went into effect in 2000 and included all coal and oil- 
fired power plants in the US with an output higher than 25 megawatts73. Allowances are 
distributed to power plants for free until 2025, with a small percentage of allowances, 2.8%, 
available for auction each year7! As under Clear Skies, industry firms are allowed to bank or 
save allowances for future use, as well as sell or trade with other emitters. The program has been 
declared a success for meeting environmental goals and reducing sulfur dioxide. By the end of 
phase I in 2000, emissions had been reduced approximately 33% from 1990 levels and there was 
100% compliance from industry polluters75. 
Cost Savings 
The most triumphed success of the Acid Rain trading program is not the environmental benefits 
realized through a reduction of sulfur dioxide, which undoubtedly would have also occurred 
under command-and-control regulation, but the achievement in reduction goals at a low cost to 
both the EPA and industry polluters. In "Ex Post Evaluation of Tradable Permits," MIT 
Professor Denny Ellerman compares the costs of compliance under a SOz tradable permits 
system with the costs of command-and-control, which is displayed in Figure 10. 
Figure 10: Cost Comparison of MACT and Emissions Trading for Sulfur Dioxide 
Source: Ellerman, A. Denny. "Ex Post Evaluation of Tradable Permits: The US SOz Cap-and-Trade Program." 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2002. 
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There are a number of challenges that can be made to the validity of comparing compliance costs 
of tradable permits with command-and-control regulation. First are the nature of innovation and 
the likeliness of innovative technology that could follow regulatory decisions. The cost of 
command-and-control technology today is a measure of static efficiency and does not account 
for inevitable increased in efficiency that would be developed if mandated under more stringent 
regulation. Second, the costs of compliance do not include the probable additional costs of 
slower regulation under cap and trade emissions trading. When health benefits are realized after 
a 1 0-year phase compliance period, rather than mandated immediately, there is a substantial cost 
in healthcare and lost productivity from those affected by the pollutant. Lastly, a basic 
comparison of compliance costs does not address the intention behind the regulation, which is to 
protect against an environmental hazard. A quantitative comparison through a cost-benefit 
analysis leaves no room for discussion of whether cap and trade is an appropriate regulation 
when the pollutant might pose a differential risk or exposure and harm for different subsets of the 
population. 
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Since the Acid Rain permit trading program is a market-based regulation, the costs of 
compliance are dependent on changes in the market and firm behavior. Without perfect market 
conditions and rational reaction from firms to market changes, the full benefits of permit trading 
as a less costly alternative to command-and-control may not be realized. There is considerable 
research that firms making decisions on whether to innovate and sell permits or use them on 
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emissions do not have the resources to make decisions and such internal knowledge would 
require high administrative costs of more personnel. Additionally, state and local politics can 
play a role in compliance decision making. As noted by Ellerman, "public utility commissions 
have adopted policies that encourage sub-optimal choices by individual utilities, such as to scrub 
local high-sulfur coal in order to protect in-state jobs7'." 
Incentives to Innovate 
In framing the SO2 permit system, Congress acknowledged the need to provide industry 
incentives for innovation. Therefore, 300,OO extra allowances were set aside as part of the 
Conservation and Renewable Energy Reserve, CRER, which would grant the extra permits to 
firms who showed increased efficiency through development of new technologies, including 
renewable energy sources. To qualify for one allowance, a firm must prove to the EPA an 
efficiency savings of 500 megawatt-hours. The expectation of Congress and the EPA was for 
firms to innovate to meet reduction goals and gain extra allowances. However, through April 
2003, only 16% of all available bonus allowances had been di~t r ibuted~~.  Of those bonus 
allowances distributed, approximately 75% were awarded for improvements in efficiency, while 
the other 25% were awarded to utilities that generated energy through renewable sources. The 
application period for CRER allowances expired in 1999, which means the Acid Rain's 
Conservation and Renewable Energy Reserve will remain with 252,500 unused allowances, 
worth approximately $37.9 million total on the market. Title IV contained an additional 
innovation incentive program titled "reduced utilization," which allocated allowances for firms 
showing better efficiency. Interestingly, the EPA did not receive a single application showing 
"reduced utilization" from the power utilities7$. This behavior from the electric power industry in 
compliance with cap and trade shows that even the incentive of pollution credits did not entice 
industry to innovate. 
Innovation under Acid Rain 
Congress and the EPA anticipated industry compliance with the cap on sulfur dioxide emissions 
from the advancement of scrubber technology. However, half as many scrubbers were used to 
meet emission reductions than anticipated by the EPA in phase I~'. In reality, only about 28% of 
reductions in SO2 emissions can be attributed to use of scrubbers or innovations in advanced 
scrubber technology. Instead, the majority of reduction goals, approximately 58%, were met by 
switching to coal with a lower concentration of sulfurR0. Instead of creating incentives for 
pollution control innovation, the Acid Rain Program changed the operation of a number of coal 
supported industries in the US. This is demonstrated by evaluating the simultaneous decrease in 
patents for scrubbers and increase in availability of inexpensive low-sulfur coal. 
Prior to the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, coal-fired power plants purchased coal from local 
suppliers to avoid the high cost of coal transport. Since most of the nation's plants are located in 
the Midwest, the high-sulfur coal found in the Appalachian Mountain region and Midwest mines 
was most frequently used. After the creation of the Acid Rain Program, which "unleashed 
competitive pressure" within the coal supply industry, transport and delivery costs dropped 
significantlys'. Innovations with the rail industry allowed for cheaper delivery from western coal, 
with a lower sulfur concentration and lower rate of SO2 emissions. Through the period from 
1990 to 1994, the price of low-sulfur coal dropped by 9%, which resulted to a 28% increase in 
the sale of low-sulfur coal. During this same time, sales of high-sulfur coal dropped by 18%, 
despite a 6% reduction in price". The tendency of industry to switch coal types instead on 
innovating through pollution capture technology is likely to repeat under a mercury emissions 
trading program, as low-sulfur coal contains approximately 30% less mercury than high-sulfur 
One of the explanations for the low rate of innovation under Acid Rain is the finding that 
"among incentive-based instruments, the incentives for innovation are greatest under auctioned 
emission permits, less with an emission tax, and least under free emission permitsY4." Since the 
Acid Rain program is still under the free allowance of emission permits, this could explain the 
reluctance to innovate. Burtraw also found that rather than development of specific pollution 
capture technologies, most of the innovation that took place under the first phase of Acid Rain 
involved organizational innovation. Figure 12 shows the number of patents filed for SO2 control 
technology over the past thirty years. Although not always an indicator of innovation, patent data 
is representative of inventive activity and a metric used for measuring probably innovation. As 
displayed in the graph, patent activity is greatest around the years of government regulation, but 
decreased after legislation goes into effect. In the years immediately following passage of the 
Clean Air Act Amendments and the start of cap and trade for SOz, the number of patents filled 
for sulfur dioxide control technologies decreases significantly. In their assessment of patent 
trends, Taylor et a1 assert that "the flexibility provided by the 1990 Acid Rain regulations 
discouraged inventive activity in techn~logies~~." Even though patent data suggests an increase 
in applications coinciding with the passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments, "there is little 
evidence that the new patents created before 1990 improved the ability of scrubber to more 
effectively control pollution86." One theory for the decrease in innovation was the ability of firms 
to meet lower emission standards without investing in new technologies. When caps are set at a 
feasible level that is already being met by industry leaders, there is little incentive for firms to 
design scrubbers that exceed emission standards. 
Figure 11: Thirty-Year Trends in Patents and R&D for SO2 Technology 
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There are several additional interesting findings from evaluating the Acid Rain trading program. 
One unpredicted result was a geographic shift in the emission of pollutants. In evaluating the SOz 
program, Burtraw et a1 discovered a "sizable geographical and temporal shift in emissions, in 
some states over 20% of emissions, due to trading and bankingx7." 
Market-based vs. Command-and-Control Regulations and innovation 
The lack of success in the Acid Rain emissions trading program to encourage innovation 
suggests that a larger discussion is needed over the theoretical drivers of innovation. This leads 
to a question of whether either command-and-control or market-based environmental regulation 
can effectively encourage technological innovation and industry behavior. Historically, federal 
environmental legislation has had mixed results in creating incentives for technology innovation 
within firms. Only through the Supplementary Environmental Programs, where penalties were 
significant enough to encourage action, was industry willing to undertake plant and process 
modernizationg8. As innovation academic Daniel Cole states, "federal air pollution control efforts 
ignored three important variables, any one of which can determine the efficacy and efficiency of 
pollution control efforts: institutional knowledge and learning; technological constraints and 
innovations; and the changing costs and benefits of pollution control over timeg9." To understand 
the likely impacts of Clear Skies on innovation of mercury control technology, one must also 
compare the objectives and incentives within theoretical market-based and command-and-control 
regulation. 
Proponents of market-based environmental regulation are quick to point out the lowered cost of 
regulatory compliance for both industry and the government in oversightg0. However, these 
lower costs are largely dependent on 100% compliance from industry and efficient monitoring 
techniques from the oversight agency. If done inefficiently and with outdated technology, costs 
of measuring point-source emissions could possible exceed the costs of research and 
development for potential new technology that would reduce emissions and eliminate the need 
for monitoring in the first place. 
With industrial innovation usually comes a first-mover advantage over competition that lags in 
innovation. Broadly speaking, with technological innovation firms are able to either differentiate 
their products to a new market or achieve a competitive advantage in a current market. Electric 
power plants, however, are somewhat immune from this first-mover advantage driver of 
innovation. Due to the nature of the commodity produced from power plants, the energy 
generation product itself can not be improved by technological innovation. From a consumer 
standpoint, environmental controls and the reduction of mercury will have no effect on the actual 
utility of electricity, but would perhaps only increase the costs of electricity to the consumer due 
to increased costs of production. Most electric utilities are under state contracts and while firms 
of other industries are in competition with each other, their output is unlikely change to despite 
variations in environmental controls that may result in different composition of their byproduct 
streams. 
Acceptance of market-based regulation as an environmental regulatory strategy raises a number 
of potential questions over other environmental decisions. By allocating free allowances under 
Clear Skies, the EPA is essentially granting industry the right to pollute hazardous air pollutants. 
This leaves open the potential for future similar decisions, using Clear Skies as the precedent to 
justify giving industry the right to pollute the atmosphere. Additionally, treating pollution as a 
right suggests that both air and emissions are defined as property, to be controlled by the EPA, 
rather than a common good allowed to society as a whole. Alternatively, a strict adherence to 
command-and-control would suggest a different principle: the polluter pays principle. In this 
regulatory scenario, the air is treated as a common good and industry is punished for emitting 
pollutants. The polluter pays principle could be enacted for mandating industry compliance to 
lower levels of emissions, which would require technology investments, or through a pollution 
tax for emissions. This would set an equally strong yet greatly different precedent, holding 
industry responsible for future release of hazardous air pollutants. 
Encouraging Innovation 
The potential failure of the Clear Skies Initiative raises serious questions over the 
appropriateness of different regulatory strategies to efficiently regulate mercury emissions, while 
simultaneously encouraging technological innovation. A review of the Acid Rain Program as a 
case study suggests that market-based regulations will do little to encourage technological 
change. Additionally, strict adherence to command-and-control regulation also raises a number 
of questions over how industry will meet compliance to regulations and leaves questions of 
impacts on innovation unanswered. 
MIT Professor John Deutch defines innovation as "the process by which technological change is 
accomplished." In outlining the measures government can take to encourage technological 
change, he defines the two steps of innovation as technology creation (i.e., invention) and 
technology deployment into society. Deutch believes deployment is by far the more difficult 
process, as it involves "(1) making an uncertain investment decision. (2) managing change in a 
production process, along with its work force, and (3) tailoring a new service or product to 
customer need." The uncertainty and risk involved with innovation adoption require government 
intervention in order to promote such innovation deployment through incentives. Deutch outlines 
the potential role of the government as a driving force for innovation through the following 
activities91 : 
establishing patents 
setting and publishing standards 
creating tax incentives for R&D 
setting export controls on technology 
promoting education of scientists and engineers 
creating mechanisms for partnerships 
providing access to venture capital 
In general, the federal government has become very skilled at invention and development of new 
technology. Through a number of national labs, research grants, and pilot programs, the 
government has developed a number of advanced air pollution control technologies. In 2006, the 
federal government will spend approximately $132 billion in total on R&D, with $8.5 billion 
allocated to the Department of Energy and $0.6 billion allocated to the Environmental Protection 
~ ~ e n c ~ ~ ~ .  Ensuring the strength of these budgetary allotments for research is the desire of 
Congressional members to please home constituencies. Government pilot projects and academic 
grants are popular political dollars within Congressional home districts. However, one area 
which needs more attention is the transfer of technology between government research and 
deployment in private industry. Even if technology is created (i.e., invented) with federal 
resources, what is the incentive for industry to adopt (i.e. commercially) such technology in plant 
processes? This requires more advances incentives for industry adoption and technology transfer. 
In evaluating the role of government in encouraging innovation, Deutch looks to the US 
Synthetic Fuels Program as a representative case study. As he notes, "the primary lesson of the 
SFC story is that the government should be very cautious in establishing large programs based 
on the assumption that current estimates will come to pass93." Suffering from a similar potential 
uncertainty as market-based regulations, government programs have potential for failure when 
they relay top heavily on predictions of markets and technological development. His final take- 
away message is that while initial government support of technology development is strong, also 
needed are indirect incentives such as tax credits, which could help demonstrate to industry that 
adoption of innovative technology is feasible, efficient, and economically desirable. 
In their work on the effects of regulation on technological change, Ashford and Caldart define 
the three decisions that must be made by policymakers prior to implementation of successful 
regulation. Those decision criteria are "a) what technological response is desirable; b) which 
industrial sector will most likely innovate; and c) what kind of regulation will most likely elicit 
the desired response94." In the case of reducing mercury emissions, the EPA has jumped to 
decision c, in formulating a policy without first addressing the objectives of such policy on 
technological response and without considering likely responsive behavior from the electric 
power industry. The current strategy to promote cap and trade has been to defend the policy 
decision by using numbers based on past success of Acid Rain Program. However, what 
alternative policy could be made if the EPA instead had a forward thinking approach and first 
began with the objective to promote technological change in the industry that would decrease the 
problem of mercury emissions? 
One of the regulatory strategies the EPA can use to encourage innovation is the granting of 
innovation waivers, which are allowed under Section I 1 1J  of the Clean Air Act. Innovation 
waivers are time extensions granted to firms trying to reach compliance by implementing 
technological change. This allows for the necessary trial and error research and development 
period. Innovation waivers however, have not been widely used by industry to date, mostly due 
to lack of encouragement on the part of the E P A ~ ~ .  However, their legal basis in the Clean Air 
Act makes incorporation of these waivers into Clear Skies relatively easy and practical. 
Challenges to Innovation 
Aside from the weaknesses in Clear Skies and market-based regulatory strategies, innovation is 
often a challenge under any environmental regulation. As noted by Carol Sanchez, "managers of 
environmentally regulated firms believe that it is harder to innovate because regulations often 
change unexpectedly and because regulators are ~n~redic tab le~~."  To create incentives for 
innovation, environmental regulations must be long-term and allow for flexibility. Michael 
Porter suggests that the most effective regulations for technological change are those that focus 
on process changes, rather than a pollution standard that would encourage a quick-fix solution97. 
In the case of the Acid Rain Program and the likely scenario under Clear Skies for mercury 
reduction, firms pursued the short-term strategy of coal switching, which allowed for immediate 
reduction in mercury emissions. This quick-fix behavior was encouraged under cap and trade 
because firms had a financial incentive to bank emission credits from early years in the program. 
With the predicted allowance schedule of mercury permits, this behavior is even more likely to 
occur, as the cost of permits increases each year. 
Section 9: State Mercury Legislation 
Under Clear Skies, states retain the authority to set their own more stringent standards for 
reducing mercury emissions. However, states are prohibited from preventing the sale, purchase, 
or trading of emission allowances. Therefore, in reality state laws can do little to interfere with 
Clear Skies cap and trade9! 
State governments largely oppose the federal Clear Skies regulations. Immediately after the 
specific regulation was announced in March 2005, thirteen states filed law suits claiming that the 
regulation should be halted and replaced by a more strict command and control strategy. This 
challenge of the federal regulation in the US Court of Appeals is led by Minnesota, Wisconsin, 
Illinois, Pennsylvania, Vermont, New Jersey, New York, Maine, New Hampshire, Connecticut, 
California, New Mexico, and Massachusetts, states mostly located in the Northeastern US and 
most vulnerable to mercury emission deposits. The opinions of the states' administrations are 
summarized by a comment made by Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal, who 
said, "This rule defies common sense and the law, and deserves a quick judicial demise. We are 
suing immediately to stop it because mercury is a proven killer and crippler, and the new rule 
gives power plants a free pass to spew this deadly neurotoxin into our air and water. The Bush 
administration has once again demonstrated that it puts corporate profits over human health and 
the environment. My office will work with other states to fight a federal flight of policy that 
threatens to sicken our citizens and despoil our en~ironment~~." As of May 2006, the law suit 
remains pending. However, a number of health organizations have now joined the suit in support 
of the states' position. Coming to the states' defense are Physicians for Social Responsibility, 
American Public Health Association, American Nurses Association, American Academy of 
Pediatrics, Sierra Club, Environmental Defense, and the National Wildlife ~ o u n d a t i o n ' ~ ~ .  
It is the states' current and previous regulation of mercury that most clearly demonstrates that 
90% reduction of mercury under MACT is both technologically and economically feasible. The 
following figure, generated from NESCAUM information, is a list of state regulations for coal- 
fired power plant mercury emissions. 
Figure 12: State Regulatory Programs for Mercury Emissions 
Source: information taken from: Amar, Praveen, Project Director. Mercziry Emissions From Coal-Fired Power 
Plants: The Case jor Regzllatory Action. NESCAUM, Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management. 
October 2003. 
Approximately 20 states are considering adopting a mercury reduction plan designed by the State 
and Territorial Air Pollution Program Administrator and Association or Local Air Pollution 
Control ~ f f i c i a l s ' ~ ' .  This strategy is expected to help states regulate in the short term while 
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lawsuits challenging Clear Skies are still pending. The new proposal has two different options 
Regulation 
90% removal of mercury or limit of 0.6 1bsiTBtu 
Phase 1 : 85% removal of mercury or limit of 0.0075 
lbs/GWh 
Phase 2: 95% removal of mercury or limit of 0.0025 
lbs/GWh 
40% reduction in mercury emissions 
80% reduction in mercury emissions 
83% mercury emission reduction 
for staging mercury reduction. The first plan has two phases, one requiring 80% emission 
reduction by 2008 and the second requiring 90-95% emission reduction by 2012. The second 
plan option requires emission reduction by 95% by 2008, while allowing plants extensions if 
they agree to install technology that will also capture SOz and NOx emissions. The plan appeals 
to industry leaders because of its built in flexibility. Until 2012, the plan would allow utilities to 
average emissions across all emitting plants in a state. After 2012, utilities would still be allowed 
to average emissions, this time within a single plant for multiple units1"'. 
Federal Preemption of State Legislation 
The resistance of many states to implement Clear Skies raises questions over federal preemption 
of environmental legislation. As written, the Clean Air Act and Clear Skies do not preempt state 
law. However, states are not allowed to interfere with the cap and trade emissions credit 
program, and are left with few regulatory strategies that could co-exist to reduce mercury 
emissions while still supporting the federal cap and trade program. There are four categories of 
federal preemption that would result in a federal policy overruling state law. The first is express 
preemption, which is explicitly directed by Congress in the language of the act. The second is 
implied preemption, which is inferred by looking closely at the Congressional record and 
language. A third type is preemption by conflict, which grants the federal regulation supremacy 
when a state and federal law directly conflict and cannot be implemented simultaneously. The 
fourth type of preemption is known as frustration on purpose, which is a combination of implied 
and conflict preemption and usually determined by the federal courts. The Clear Skies Initiative 
effectively preempts state power through conflict preemption, since technology-based command- 
and-control policy using MACT standards is not compatible with the market-based cap and trade 
scheme. 
In recent years, states have seen a shift in the number of topic areas that are preempted by federal 
legislation. Since 1990, Congress has passed 1 17 laws that preempt and usurp power from the 
states'03. This has led to conflicts between the federal government and the states. In addition to 
losing the power to legislate their own citizens, states are often left paying for implementation of 
federal legislation. It is estimated that unfunded federal mandates have cost states $75 billion in 
the past two years (2004-2006)~~! It appears that the trend toward federal preemption is 
continuing. There has been recent discussion of a Congressional act that would declare federal 
preemption of state legislation for all environmental laws. The Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution allows the federal government to preempt state laws in this manner. Therefore if the 
environmental preemption law is passed by Congress, states will be able to do little to challenge 
the Constitutionality of the move and will have no power to regulate around the Clear Skies 
Initiative. 
Section 10: International Regulatory Strategies 
Compounding the problem of controlling mercury pollution through regulations is that mercury 
can travel globally, and therefore requires global cooperation to decrease emissions. When 
mercury particles enter the air from flue gas, they can travel across the world before being 
deposited. This claim is supported scientifically by the increasing deposits of mercury found in 
Antarctica, which were discovered in 1998 and are frequently referred to as the "Mercury 
Sunrise" phenomenon. Mercury emissions from a range of global power plants enter the 
atmosphere and travel the globe as vapor. Each day the strong UV rays of the Antarctic sunrise 
spurs chemical reactions and results in the deposition of mercury in snow banks. Both Antarctica 
and the Artic Polar caps have seen an increase in mercury deposition in the past decade, even 
through they remain free of mercury pollution sources'05. 
To examine the global context of current US attempts to regulate mercury emissions, it is 
important to consider the US as a mercury pollution emitter as well as receiver. The breakdown 
of global anthropogenic mercury emissions, attributed by nation and geographic region is show 
in Figures 13 and 14. These charts clearly show that the US emits a significant percentage of 
mercury, but is even more vulnerable by mercury pollution emitted in Asian countries. Global 
modeling has suggested that the US receives a considerable amount of mercury deposits 
originating in China and other Asian nations. Meanwhile, Canada and Europe bear the burden of 
US mercury deposits in their lakes and rivers. Thus the individual national regulatory strategies 
for reducing mercury emissions have a considerable effect on global neighbors and allies, adding 
to the political complexity of the mercury problem. 
Figure 13: Global Emissions of Anthropogenic Mercury Emissions by Nation or Region 
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Source: Information used in graph from: Miller, Michael. "Mercury Resources Update." From the EPRI Conference 
on Addressing the Mercury Problem: Global Challenge, Local Impact. Washington, DC. June 15,2004. 
Figure 14: Percentage of Mercury Emissions Attributed to Nation or Region 
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on Addressing the Mercury Problem: Global Challenge, Local Impact. Washington, DC. June 15,2004. 
International Strategies 
Although mercury from anthropogenic sources has been recognized repeatedly as a global 
problem, there exists no legally binding international strategy for reduction of mercury 
emissions. With the increased awareness of heavy metals as a global environmental health 
problem during the 19907s, the dangerous health effects of mercury were brought into the 
spotlight. The 1990 International Conference on Mercury as a Global Pollutant was the first 
international conference held specifically to address intemational cooperation for reduction of 
mercury. The conference has since been held every two years and often serves to encourage 
further advancement of studies on mercury health and environmental impacts, as well as 
development of new regulatory strategies and advanced technologies to reduce mercury output. 
A number of factors contribute to the delay of implementation of a legally binding international 
regulation for mercury. Most notable is the resistance from the United States. As argued by 
Noelle Selin before the Berlin Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental 
Change, resistance from the U.S. can be attributed to 1) the political philosophy of the Bush 
administration to resist involuntary international agreements and 2) the Administration's political 
and financial relationship with electric utilities, which make regulation of those industries 
political difficultio6. 
National politics and principles are also to blame for the resistance of other nations to get behind 
a legally binding international regulation. Canada, for example, does not support an international 
binding regulation for mercury for fear that it might set a precedent for strict international 
regulation of other heavy metals. Since the Canadian economy is in part dependent on the mining 
of heavy metals such as cadmium and lead, future metals regulation would be a significant 
economic hindrance. Canada also highlights the financial overhead required of an intemational 
legally binding declaration, which would require a significant amount of funding dedicated to 
negotiation travel instead of directly funding a national-level plan to reduce mercury'07. 
There are a number of global strategies to reduce mercury, most of which originate from the 
United Nations and European Union. The 2003 United Nations Heavy Metals Protocol targets 
mercury as one of three metal pollutants that must be returned to pre-1990 emission levels'08. In 
2002 the United Nations Environment Programme, UNEP, reported their global assessment of 
mercury. The UNEP Governing Council recommended several strategies aimed at reducing 
mercury pollution, including compliance to standards by all nations and technology transfer from 
developed nations to developing nations that need can not support in-house R&D for 
environmental innovation log. 
The Commission of European Communities was quick to respond, issuing a strategy to combat 
mercury. Their own study took a life-cycle approach to analyzing mercury and conducted an 
Extended Impact Assessment' lo. The EU pointed out that there is a "global pool" of mercury that 
continues to cause health effects as it "mobilized, deposited, and remobilized.'"" In order to 
reduce mercury emissions, Europe recommends requiring emission controls for plants and grants 
an extension to new still developing member states. Mercury is treated as a "classical" air 
pollutant under Clean Air for Europe, CAFE, and is thus subject to traditional control strategies 
limiting emissions 12. 
European Union 
With a strong emphasis on environmental regulation, Europe is a global leader in anthropogenic 
mercury reduction. Although the global total of mercury emissions increased by 20% from 1990 
0 113 to 2000, mercury emissions in the European Union fell by 60 /o . Most of this progress was 
realized as the byproduct of regulatory controls of other air pollutants from coal-fired sources. 
Although the European Union has been active in regulating mercury products, there still exists 
no binding regulatory program for the reduction of mercury emissions from coal-fired power 
plants. 
In 2005, the Commission of European Communities sent a proposal to the European Parliament 
addressing actions leading to the reduction of mercury emissions. Among the proposed actions 
was support of the United Nations Global Mercury Programme and Heavy Metals Protocol, as 
well as funding a pilot program to help reduce mercury emissions in developing nations such as 
China, India, and Russia. To assist in this global effort, the EU plans to be a leader in technology 
transfer, aiding developing nations in upgrading coal-burning technologies. 
In March 2006, the European Parliament accepted the suggestions for mercury reduction made in 
the report from the Commission of European Communities. This acknowledgement of mercury 
emissions as a significant problem is an important step in regulating mercury in the EU. While 
the Parliament's affirmation of all recommended policies of the EC is not binding, it is likely to 
be respected and therefore passed. To accomplish the mercury emission goal, the European 
Parliament stressed their preference for BAT, best achievable technology, which is the EU 
counterpart to the MACT program in the US. 
Although the nation is similar to the US in their reluctance to enter into an internationally legally 
binding agreement to reduce mercury, Canada has a strict national regulatory strategy to combat 
mercury fiom anthropogenic sources. As the recipient of much of the mercury emissions from 
the US mid-west, Canada has a significant stake in regional partnerships for the reduction of 
mercury in North America. 
Canada is responsible for 8 tones of the 2,200 annual tones of global mercury emissions released 
into the air each year. This is significantly lower than the 106 annual tones released by sources in 
the US. Due to regional weather patterns and the ability of mercury to travel in the atmosphere 
for weeks of years before returning to earth, eastern Canada is the recipient for much of the 
mercury emission from the concentration of electric utility plants in the American mid-west. 
Overall an average of 10% of mercury deposits in Canada can be attributed to US sources, while 
that number increases to 38% in the Canadian Great Lakes region. 
In June 2005, the Canadian Council of Ministries of the Environment proposed updated 
regulations for reducing anthropogenic mercury in the nation, while also criticizing the US cap 
and trade policy under Clear Skies for its relaxed approach to mercury regulation and therefore 
potentially detrimental effect on Canadian health and safety. The national Canadian strategy for 
reducing mercury emissions relies on command-and-control regulation as well as a national 
emissions cap. New coal-fired plants must meet mercury reduction under BACT, best available 
control technologies, effective immediately. This results in a 75%-85% reduction in mercury 
emissions, depending on the type of coal used at the plant. Existing plants will face a cap on 
mercury emissions in 2010, requiring 65% capture from coal, which is essentially a 52%-58% 
reduction in mercury emissions from 2004 levels. In 201 8, the cap will increase to require an 
80% capture of mercury from all burned coal1 l! An additional feature of the Canadian system is 
that while a national cap is in place, provinces are also capped at specific levels. This 
regionalization of regulations will ensure that each region sees a decrease in mercury emissions, 
preventing the potential for differential risk and the emergence of hot-spots that could occur 
under cap and trade in the United States. 
Developing Nations 
Given the potential for global transport of mercury emissions, coal-fired power plants that go 
unregulated in developing nations are a serious concern. China, with its 2,000 and growing 
number of coal-fired power plants, is the largest global mercury polluter. Its 600 tons of annual 
emissions makes up '/4 of the total anthropogenic mercury emissions in the world1 15. 
Unfortunately for China, like most developing nations, there is little regulatory structure 
protecting citizens from air pollution. Instead, national pressure is placed on increasing 
development and industrialization, often with serious health consequences. Water tests from 
Chinese rivers indicate that people consuming fish from such rivers at ingesting mercury at a 
level 18 times what is allowed in the US116. The current regulatory structure allowed Chinese 
plants to emit mercury or pay an essentially low fee of $500,000 to the government117. While this 
encourages the growth of power plants, it is troubling for other nations receiving deposits of 
China's mercury emissions. Studies from water sampling in the US have indicated that deposits 
in New England have a composition that matches emissions from Chinese plants1 1 8 .  
In addition to the lax regulatory structure for air pollution and mercury in China, dramatic 
growth of coal-fired plants is anticipated in the region. By 2020, the electrical capacity of China 
is expected to double, with almost 75% of this power being produced from coal-fired plants. The 
coal demand is already rising, with a 12% increase in coal consumption over the past year1 19. 
Future Role of Global Regulation 
Global environmental regulation is often hindered by a difference in national policy preference 
for means to control a pollutant. The US typically prefers a back-end approach to regulation, 
with policies focused on end-of-pipe control technology and a legal structure that allows for tort 
suits after harm is committed. The European perspective is much different, and often favors a 
front-end approach, with more policy influencing process design and requirements for pre- 
emission permits. While the US has recently favored market-based environmental regulations, 
Europe has remained true to their standard of Best Available Technology. The European system 
is much more welcoming of the Precautionary Principle, which advocates that the absence of 
evidence of harm does not indicate absence of harm, and some restrictions on potential harm are 
justified even before conclusive evidence is available. The major theoretical differences in 
approaching regulatory partnerships is made even more difficult by the presence of developing 
nations, many of which have no environmental regulation for air pollutants and are less likely to 
desire such controls. 
As mercury is a global pollutant, it is important to reach international cooperation to reduce 
emissions from the main emitter, coal-fired power plants. US reluctance to enter into other 
international environmental partnerships, such as Kyoto, as well as diminishing relations with 
other nations due to unrelated international conflicts, has decreased the likelihood of a global 
initiative with US participation. More important is Canada's and the EU's rejection of the Clear 
Skies Initiative with cap and trade as the US basis for regulation of mercury. Unfortunately 
implementation of Clear Skies appears likely to worsen rather than strengthen US-International 
relations on the matter of environmental regulation. 
Section I 1  : Alternative Mercury Regulatory Strategies 
With the Clear Skies Initiative hotly contested in the press, challenged legally in the US court 
system, and still not implemented by industry, the timing is right for a second look at the 
regulatory policy to reduce mercury emissions. In addition to challenging the legality of the 
EPA7s cap and trade approach to mercury regulation, states are aggressively fighting for the 
authority to regulate mercury emissions within their own borders. With so many critics and an 
increasing amount of evidence that raises serious questions about the safety of mercury cap and 
trade, the EPA should begin addressing alternative approaches to achieve a reduction in mercury 
emissions. This consideration of alternatives, although usually mandated by Congress and the 
OMB, was neglected when Clear Skies was first proposed. The exploration of alternatives should 
start with plans already developed by state and local governments. Additionally, the EPA should 
return to the language of Section 112 of the Clean Air Act and the mercury reduction proposals 
under Clinton's Administration to identify a technology-based MACT mercury policy. Lastly, if 
the EPA remains set on implementing a cap and trade policy for reduction of mercury emissions, 
the agency should consider implementation of previously omitted protective features of cap and 
trade, such as geographic or temporal restrictions on trading, or enhancement of the EPA's 
policy of granting innovation waivers for those firms wishing to upgrade to cleaner technology. 
With mercury emissions becoming an increasingly known health hazard, the EPA has the ability 
to gain public favor with implementation of strict technology-based standards, overlooking cost- 
benefit analysis and instead arguing for the protection of human health and safety. 
MA CT-based Regulation 
The Clean Air Act Amendments clearly demonstrate the intentions of Congress in how the EPA 
should regulate Hazardous Air Pollutants. Section 112 not only lists mercury components as a 
risk and mandates their regulation, but very specifically details how mercury is to be regulated 
by holding all plants accountable to the same levels of output achieved by the top 12% of 
performers with the lowest mercury emissions. Had Congress desired the EPA to consider 
market-based alternatives, the Maximum Achievable Control Technology standard would not 
have been so clearly specified and defined. The EPA7s decision to instead reduce mercury under 
a cap and trade approach came out of a cost-benefit analysis, one that was not directly required 
by Congress in the Clean Air Act. Instead of requiring such a cost-based evaluation of 
alternatives, Congress used the standard of setting regulations on par with the top 12% of 
performers to ensure that mercury reduction at this level was in fact economically and 
technologically feasible, as it was already being done by 12% of the industry. If some current 
power generators can not comply, new power entities can be built or existing efficient ones 
expanded to replace them. 
As mentioned early, implementation of standards based on MACT would result in immediate 
reductions in mercury emissions up to 90%. This is a considerably greater reduction of mercury 
than would take place under Clear Skies, which reduces mercury by 69% by 20 18. In favoring 
their cap and trade scheme, the EPA neglected health information suggesting the grave danger of 
methylmercury exposure, instead conducting the cost-benefit analysis that led to the cap and 
trade decision without any inclusion of medical costs or costs of lost productivity due to 
methylmercury caused disabilities. What was also not considered was advanced pollution control 
technology, with greater potential to further reduce mercury emissions and at a fraction of the 
current cost. Ironically, it is implementation of a strict technology-based standard that would 
initiate rapid diffusion of these new technologies, while also encouraging further innovation. 
Without a regulation forcing innovation of new technology, there is little promise for industry 
development or installation of mercury reduction controls. 
State-based Regulation 
States have a long history of regulating environmental pollution within their borders, usually 
with much success. However, this ability has been challenged by recent trends toward federal 
preemption of state laws. As discussed in Section 9, a number of states are challenging the Clear 
Skies Act and instead in favor of more strict command-and-control regulations. 
Since one of the main dangers in allowing Clear Skies to pass is the creation of hot-spots and 
differing amounts of mercury exposure on regional populations, it makes sense to allow states 
the power to control mercury emissions within their borders. With the potential for national 
permit trading under Clear Skies, it would be possible for a state to only see an increase in 
mercury emissions, while the benefits are passed on to those in other states. Most states are 
calling for more stringent standards than those currently proposed under Clear Skies. A leader in 
mercury reduction, Massachusetts would call for an 85% reduction in mercury emissions starting 
in fall 2006. The economic and technological feasibility for this standard is based on the current 
performance of the top 12% of lowest mercury emitters in the industry, the same standard that 
would be applied federally under MACT. The benefit of state-based regulation is that states have 
more detailed information about their own pollution production from local industries. States can 
use such knowledge to create regulatory policy that would eliminate the potential for areas of 
high mercury deposition. In states with large concentrations of power plants, such as those in the 
Ohio River Valley, this might mean technology-forcing. However, for states in the Pacific 
Northwest with relatively little mercury emissions, a statewide cap and trade program might 
suffice. 
One of the main ways states are fighting the federal preemption of mercury legislation and 
challenging Clear Skies is through a grassroots effort and the support of many newly formed 
mercury advocacy groups. In Massachusetts, the New England Zero Mercury campaign and 
Mercury Policy Project are major players in disseminating public information on the harms of 
methylmercury. Their cause has been supported by national citizen groups such as the National 
Resources Defense Council and Clean Water Action Group. The success of these groups in 
increasing the numbers of citizens concerned about methylmercury exposure is an encouraging 
sign for those fighting for state autonomy in regulating mercury emissions. 
Limited Cap and Trade Regulation 
With the Administration's insistence on regulating mercury through a market-based cap and 
trade approach, it is perhaps more realistic to discuss modifications to the cap and trade program, 
rather than calling for an overhaul of the system and implementation of MACT standards. One 
aspect of Clear Skies that might be changed is the permit allocation process. Rather than free 
allowances in the first year of the program, a fee-based credit system could better encourage 
firrns to innovate rather than pay to pollute. Additionally, innovation waivers could be granted as 
before under the Acid Rain Program. Yet to increase the success of this option, further incentives 
perhaps in the form of funding or time extensions should be granted. Further, the EPA could 
evaluate the possibility of a pollution offset system of cap and trade, which would regionally 
define polluters and only allow for trading within a polluter's own zone. 
A further modification to cap and trade has recently been studied and advocated by Woodrow 
Wilson School Professor Denise Mauzerall. Through modeling of NOx emissions and their 
movement in the atmosphere before depositing, Mauzerall has been able to conclude that it is 
possible to predict the originating source for air pollutants. This leads to the potential for 
implementation of a variable charging system, increasing the fee for those polluters creating the 
most damage and leading to the creation of hot-spots. This difference in damage caused by 
emissions might be due to weather patterns, presence of a downwind area of high population 
density, or existence of reacting organisms that make pollution effects more harmful. In the case 
of mercury, location near large bodies of water such as the Great Lakes increases the 
harmfulness of nearby mercury emissions. Based on such modeling data, Mauzerall suggests that 
permit prices be adjusted accordingly for different polluters based on the probable damage 
caused by their emissions. She argues that such a scheme would "attach externality-correcting 
prices to emissions.. . Charging emitters fees that are commensurate with the damage caused by 
their.. .emissions would create an incentive for emitters to reduce emissions at times and in 
locations where they cause the largest damage120." 
The Precautionary Principle 
Section 112 of the Clear Air Act mandates technology-based MACT standards be used to ensure 
for economic and technological feasibility. However, the language of Section 1 12 also allows for 
more stringent regulations if the hazard demands such protection. Section 1 12(d)4 allows the 
Administrator to consider the determined threshold for any air pollution when regulating 
emissions. Currently, the reference dose for methylmercury is set at 0.1 micrograms per kilogram 
of body weight per day. By EPA policy, this is set as 111 0" of the approximated threshold. 
However, given recent data that 1 in 8 women in the US has elevated levels of mercury in her 
blood, resulting in 630,000 babies born each year with disabilities linked to methylmercury 
exposure, this reference dose should reexamined. It is becoming clearer that women in the US 
are exposed to mercury emissions beyond those values recommended by the EPA and FDA, 
suggesting that regulations are not adequately controlling exposure through emissions. 
Additionally, new epidemiological and toxicology studies have been released in recent years, 
suggesting new disabilities and disorders that might be caused by exposure. This would support a 
reevaluation of the methylmercury threshold, last evaluated in 2000 by the National Research 
Council. If such a threshold for methylmercury exposure was lowered, the EPA would be 
justified under Section 1 12 to greatly reduce mercury emissions, regardless of the current 
performance of the industry's top 12% of performers in reducing emissions. 
The recent and increasing health studies linking methylmercury to a number of neurological and 
behavioral disorders is reason to argue for implementation of the precautionary principle. This 
principle, upheld by the Supreme Courts although not found in US law, says that one should 
regulate if a harm is suspected, even in the absence of conclusive evidence. It is based on the 
principle of "first do no harm," and protects against false-negatives, or harms that go unregulated 
simply because the science did not exist to conclusively prove their existence. The Precautionary 
Principle was adopted at the UN Conference on Environment and Development in 1992 as an 
appropriate means to regulate environmental harms. Although rarely used in the US, it is more 
popular in European law and is used to regulate against a number of hazards in the EU. While 
some critics of the precautionary principle warn about its costly implications to industry, such a 
stringent regulation would not only protect against mercury exposure, but force innovation 
within industry, resulting in advanced and inexpensive mercury control technology or process 
changes. 
Section 12: Conclusions 
The Bush Administration's proposed Clear Skies Initiative is troubling for a number of reasons. 
Foremost, the decision to regulate through a market-based regime such as cap and trade is a 
direct violation of the Clean Air Act Section 112, which requires a control based on technology 
that matches the current best 12% of industrial mercury emitters. If the Administration 
implemented this required approach, mercury reductions would reach 90% in the coming years. 
Instead, cap and trade will slowly reduce mercury emissions over a twenty year period, 
culminating in a 69% reduction in mercury emissions. Legal arguments aside, it is this difference 
in mercury emissions that might be allowable over the next twenty years that poses the greatest 
concern to critics of Clear Skies, which are the immense health effects linked to methylmercury 
exposure. 
Neurological damage, cardiac damage, physical disabilities, autism, and behavioral disorders 
have all been linked to in utero exposure to methylmercury. Most troubling is the statistic that 1 
in 8 women in the US already has elevated levels of mercury in her blood, with women 
consuming a high percentage fish-based diet having mercury levels exceeding the EPA reference 
does by ten times. As there are 45 US states currently under mercury fish advisories, avoiding a 
dietary intake of mercury can be difficult to achieve. These developing health effects make a 
strong case for standards that would satisfy MACT or provide stricter regulation. 
The flaws of the Clear Skies Act regulation of mercury can be broken down into four categories: 
emergence of hot-spots, health effects that have gone unaccounted, stunting technological 
innovation, and attributing to the global mercury problem. The expected success of Clear Skies 
has been entirely based on the Acid Rain Program of the 1990's, which reduced sulfur dioxide 
emissions in the US. However, the properties of mercury and risks of methylmercury make the 
pollutant a unique threat. A simple overview of the properties of mercury demonstrates that 
regional hot-spots might indeed be possible under Clear Skies, with dangerous health 
consequences. Since the emergence of hot-spots has been overlooked by the EPA in drafting 
Clear Skies, the health impacts of the regulation were erroneously omitted, leading to a skewed 
cost-benefit analysis. Several academic studies have determined that when the health effects of 
increased mercury exposure under Clear Skies are included in a cost-benefit analysis, the costs of 
the regulation are immense and even exceed those of a technology-based control regulation. 
Also overlooked in the discussion of Clear Skies is the potential impact of the regulation on 
technological innovation in the electric power industry. Data from the Acid Rain case study 
suggests that in the face of cap and trade, industrial firms are most likely to switch coal types or 
buy emission permits, rather than invest in innovation and control technology, as would be 
required under MACT. While this behavior may achieve some mercury reduction in the short- 
term, it inhibits innovation within industry for long-term changes in. power plant technology, 
which will ultimately be needed to alleviate problems of air pollution. 
Lastly, the Clear Skies Act raises significant questions over the intentions of the US to 
participate in an international partnership for the reduction of mercury emissions. Strongly 
opposed by both Canada and Europe. the US plan will likely hinder hture environmental 
partnerships and make consensus on future mercury reduction programs more challenging. 
Unfortunately national partisan politics is resulting in an international consequence of lessen the 
global community's ability to control mercury emissions from coal-fired power plants. 
This paper has worked through the arguments against Clear Skies, relying on legal challenges, 
medical studies, academic studies, comparisons with the Acid Rain Program, and global 
regulatory comparisons, in order to demonstrate the far-reaching implications of the Act. While 
global relations, impacts on innovation, and economics are all important factors, the most 
important factor in mercury regulation remains protection of human health and safety. It is in 
failing to achieve this goal that Clear Skies has the most potential for failure and irreversible 
harm. To protect the nation's citizens as written in the statutory mandate given to the EPA, a 
more stringent regulation based not on markets, but on technology, is necessary. Whether that 
legislation takes the form of enhanced cap and trade with innovation incentives, strict 
technology-forcing legislation, or more control handed over to the states, an alternative to the 
proposed Clear Skies Act will better address the threat of mercury emissions and exposure. 
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